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A Little Theory Is a Dangerous Thing: 
The Myth of Adjudicative Retroactivity 
KERMIT ROOSEVELT III' 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The question of retroactivity is what to do when the law changes. 
More precisely, it is to whom the new law should be applied, and to whom 
the old. There are different answers to the question of differing degrees of 
plausibility. Some are quite old and others fairly new. But lurking behind 
the various instances ofthe question and its proposed solutions is a distinct 
intellectual difficulty, which 1 will call the problem of retroactivity. The 
question is a fairly narrow doctrinal issue: what rules should govern tran-
sitions between legal regimes? The problem is broader, and more juris-
prudential. It is that the question has proved so hard to answer, that our 
jurisprudence has lurched from one solution to the next. This Article is 
not going to answer the question; it is going to solve the problem. 
Law changes in two primary ways: via legislative and judicial action. 
Clearly a new statute changes the law. Legislative retroactivity has proved 
somewhat difficult to identify, 1 but the rules that govern it are fairly well 
established. Legislation is presumptively treated as non-retroactive, but it 
may, subject to certain limitations imposed by the Ex Post Facto Clause, 
operate retroactively if the legislature so desires. 2 
* Senior Research Scholar. Yale Law School, Resident Fellow, Information Society Project. 
A.B. Hanard I 993. JD. Yale 1997. I thank Beth Apse/, Chris Kut::., and Stephen F. Williams for 
helpjid advice and comments. Bruce Ackerman deserves special gratitude for contributions to both 
the Article and its subject matter. Faults are mine. 
I. The difficulty lies in identifying, or stipulating. what counts as a "retroactive" effect. Courts 
have distinguished between "primary" and "secondary" retroactivity, of which the former alters the 
pas/legal effect of past conduct, and the latter only thejzaure legal effect of past conduct. See Bowen 
v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 220 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring). Commentators have 
attacked the entire concept of retroactive effect as inherently confused. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, 
Rerroacriviry and Legal Change.· An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1055, 1069 (1997); 
see generally Stephen R. Munzer, Retroactive Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 374 .. 31 ( 1977) (discussing 
the faults and strengths of various theories of retroactive law). 
2 . See Landgraf v. U.S. I. Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994). A competing line of cases, now 
disfavored. applied new statutory law to actions predating the enactment of the statute. See Bradley v. 
1075 
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Judicial retroactivity is far more complicated. Judicial decisions oper-
ate on several different kinds of law: common law, statutes, and the Con-
stitution. The differing positive sources of the law being changed impart a 
different character to each type of decision. At one end of the spectrum lie 
judicial interpretations of statutes. The judicial decisions are evidence of 
what the law is, but they are not, except in a purely predictive sense, the 
law. The law is the statute; take it away, and the judicial decisions lose 
their force. Since an unchanging3 statute backs the judicial interpretations, 
it makes sense to say that while decisions may change, the law remains the 
same. An overruled decision is simply wrong; it is not and was never the 
law. Consequently, retroactivity in statutory interpretation is not very dif-
ficult. The new, correct decision is applied to everyone. 4 
At the other end of the spectrum is the common law. Once it was be-
lieved that the common law had a positive source independent of judicial 
decisions, but this view has no modern adherents . Instead, it is now rec-
ognized that the positive source of the common law is just the judicial 
decisions in which it is embodied. With no positive source independent of 
judicial decisions, the law must change as the decisions change. Conse-
quently, it makes sense to distinguish between old law and new law. 
When law changes, there is a real question as to when it does so, and there 
are real questions about to whom the new law should be applied . 
Occupying the middle ground, and serving as the focus for this Arti-
cle, is constitutional law. An analysis that works in terms of positive 
source is difficult, since the origin of constitutional law proves surpris-
ingly hard to identify Constitutional law has a positive source-the hal-
lowed document-independent of judicial decisions. But the view that the 
Constitution means now what it always has, and always will, has serious 
difficulties. This is not to say that it does not have redoubtable defenders,5 
nor that, as a normative theory of interpretation , it is unattractive. The 
School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711 ( 1974): Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S 
268, 281 ( 1969) ; United States v. The Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S (I Cranch) I 03 ( 180 I) . Landgraf made 
a heroic, although not entirely convincing, attempt to rationalize the tre atment of retroactive 
legisl ation without abandoning these cases. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 273-79. 
3. While statutes are obv iously unchanging from a certain perspective (if not amended, their 
words remain constant) , they may actuall y direct different results at different times as the surrounding 
legal context changes. For instance, a statute that conditions on a conviction for a crime ''o f moral 
turpitude" might well have been triggered by a broader range of conduct in 185 0 than it would be 
today. 
4. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991 ): cf Davi s v. 
United States, 417 U.S. 333 , 346-47 (1974) (holding that co llateral relief is available if a new deci sion 
establishes that a prisoner was convicted "for an act that the law docs not make criminal ") 
5. For example, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia. See. e.g., Ameri can Trucking Ass·ns v. 
Smith , 496 U.S . 167, 201 ( 1989) (Scal ia, J .. concu rring) (stating that "the Constitution does not 
change from year to year"). 
.. 
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difficulty is rather that it is hard to keep a straight face while suggesting 
that the current panoply of substantive and procedural rights has always 
existed, or, to take a less controversial example, that the First Amendment 
has always embodied its current congeries of doctrines and distinctions. 6 
The idea of an unchanging Constitution, as a descriptive matter, is a poor 
fit with the realities of doctrinal evolution. Functionally, constitutional 
law more closely resembles common law than statutory interpretation. 
These types of law lie, as I have been saying, along a spectrum. Some 
statutes have gaps, like the meaning of "restraint of trade" in the Sherman 
Act, 7 that are large enough that courts filling them in are essentially en-
gaging in common lawmaking. 8 But there is no principled difference be-
tween gap-filling and interpretation. An approach to the question of retro-
activity based on positive source, then, can explain judicial behavior in 
some cases, but it will not help to decide the hard questions. Nor, as will 
be seen later, is this type of metaphysical analysis especially useful in re-
solving the practical difficulties raised by adjudicative retroactivity. 
In fact, there may be no analysis that satisfactorily answers the ques-
tion of retroactivity. This is because the question has been posed in the 
wrong way, lodged in an analytic framework that sets up insuperable diffi-
culties. The purpose of this Article is to shatter that framework and in so 
doing to dissolve the difficulties, but shattering and dissolution are a ways 
down the road. The first task, the concern of Part II, is to articulate the 
question as it has been posed and to examine the attempts of the Supreme 
Comi and its academic auxiliaries to answer it. Part III then attempts to 
reveal the conceptual apparatus that drives us to that way of posing it, and 
to propose an alternative way ofthinking. 
Though it pauses at times to engage in theoretical analysis, this Article 
at heart tells a story. Stripped to its essentials, the story chronicles four 
different legal regimes. First, in the old days of the common law, judicial 
lawmaking was understood as law-finding. 9 Following the lead of Wil-
liam Blackstone, judges conceived of the common law as existing inde-
pendent of judicial decisions, a timeless constant that judges struggled to 
discern. To put it in terms of the discussion above, all judicial lawmaking 
partook of the theoretical structure of statutory interpretation, and when 
later judicial decisions reached results incompatible with earlier ones, this 
was not viewed as a change in the law. Consequently, questions of retro-
6. For an insightful analysis of the evolution of First Amendment doctrine, see David Yassky, 
Eras of the First Amendment, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1699 (1991 ). 
7. 15 U S.C.§ I (1994). 
8. But cf RICHARD A. POSNER. THE PROBLEMS OF JURJSPRUDENCE 289 ( 1990) (rebutting the 
view that the Sherman Act delegates common law authority to courts). 
9. See infra Part ll.A.l 
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act1v1ty were easy, indeed, invisible. New judicial rules, seen as more 
accurate statements of the law, were applied to the parties before the court 
regardless of when the transaction being litigated took place. Because the 
law itself did not change, there was no sense in which the decisions oper-
ated retroactively. 
The second era 10 opened with the Supreme Court's decision in Erie 
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. 11 Erie rejected the idea that judicial decisions 
were merely evidence of an unchanging common law; instead , it recog-
nized that the common law was nothing more than those deci s ions . Con-
sequently, a decision reaching a new result made new law, and the ques-
tion of retroactivity appeared for the first time: Should the new law be 
applied to transactions that took place before the date of the law-changing 
decision? During this second era, courts answered the question affirma-
tively, basing decisions on the law in force at the time the decisions were 
rendered, regardless of what the law might have been at the time of the 
transaction being litigated. This practice has some intuitive appeal. A 
new rule will presumably be adopted because it is thought superior to the 
old one, and the reasons why it is superior will often-though not al-
ways-apply to the parties before the court. 12 The jurisprudence of thi s 
second regime reflects an awareness of retroactivity and of prospectivity 
(the technique of applying new rules only to cases arising after the new 
rules are announced). 13 But because the general approach was still for 
courts to apply the law in effect at the time they rendered decisions, there 
was no need to ask whether a decision operated retroactively in the sense 
of changing what the law was in the past. 
This approach, which I will call "the decision-time model" was the 
hallmark of the second regime. The third era starts with the Warren 
Court's decision in Linkletter v. Walker, 14 and it marks a radical break 
from the past in terms of both the results reached and, more significantly, 
the analytical approach. 15 Linkletter abandoned the second regime's prin-
ciple that courts should apply the law in effect at the time they render their 
decisions. Instead, it started from the premise that parties should be gov-
l 0. See infra Part II.A.2. 
II. 304 U S. 64 (I 938). 
12. If the new rule is thought substantivel y more fa ir (because, for example , it imposes th e 
"correct" standard of care on a landowner), the value of fairn ess will usually be promoted by applying 
the new rule to the parties before the court. If the new ruie is thought better because it increases 
predictability, however, the value of predictability will seldom be served by ap plicati on to parti es who 
expected their conduct to be governed by a different rule . 
13. See infra Part ll .A.2. 
14. 381 U.S.618(1965). 
15. Seeinfra PartliA.3. 
• 
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erned by the law in effect at the time ojtheir actions. 16 This premise is the 
hallmark of what I will call "the transaction-time model." This approach 
made it easier to employ prospectivity, which was undoubtedly a main 
purpose of the theoretical switch. However, it complicated the effort to 
obtain the results that formerly were reached simply by applying current 
law. 17 For if the result dictated by current law is to be reached despite the 
fact that the appropriate law is the law in effect at the time of the transac-
tion, the law-changing decision must reach back in time to change what 
the law was. The Warren Court's switch from the decision-time to the 
transaction-time model is the birth of modern retroactivity jurisprudence. 
The fourth regime 18 is the history of attempts to cope with the Warren 
Court's legacy. As later sections will show, the transaction-time model 
bequeathed us by the Warren Court is prey to insuperable theoretical diffi-
culties. Modem jurisprudence has with great difficulty made its way back 
to the principle that new law should generally govern parties regardless of 
when the transaction being litigated took place. But it has done so within 
the transaction-time model; it has done so by asserting that ever-broader 
categories of decisions are to be applied retroactively. Consequently, it 
has not freed itself from the difficulties that attended the Warren Court's 
jurisprudence, and the current law of retroactivity is widely regarded as 
intellectually unsatisfactory . This is terribly ironic, for what has happened 
is that the concept of retroactivity has assumed greater prominence as part 
of an attempt to solve a problem that was created by the introduction of 
that very concept. 
This Article was inspired by the recognition of that irony, but it does 
not aim simply to point out the humor in our predicament. It offers the 
possibility of solving the problem of retroactivity by returning to the juris-
prudence of the second regime. This is a simple point, but a convincing 
presentation of it requires not only recounting the history of retroactivity 
jurisprudence but also developing an appropriate perspective from which 
to view it. Without the theory, the story is all but pointless; without the 
story, the theory is numbingly abstruse and esoteric. The Article tries to 
weave the two together, but even this introduction is no doubt rendered a 
bit cryptic by the lack of theoretical ground-laying. The next section thus 
undertakes a necessary exposition of the analytical framework and intro-
duces a bit of useful vocabulary; then, the real story will begin. 
16. See infra notes 209-13 and accompanying text. 
17. See infra Part lll.A . l. 
18. See infra Part ll.B . 
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II. THE QU ESTION OF RETROACTIVITY 
Consider a transaction between two parties occurring at Time 1 and a 
lawsuit filed immediately thereafter. Under the settled law at Time 1, 
Party A will prevail (the "transaction-time result") . At Time 2, the Su-
preme Court hands down a law-changing deci s ion; under the new law, 
Party B will prevail (the "decision-time result"). 19 At Time 3, the lawsuit 
comes before the Court.20 
It is clear that there are two possible outcomes. Either Party A wins, 
or Party B does : The Court will reach either the transaction-time or the 
decision-time result. What determines the outcome? Although the Court 
has recently characterized the issue as one of temporal "choice of laws,"21 
the actual analysis it performs bears no obvious resemblance to any cur-
rently popular approach to choice of law.22 It starts from the premise that 
parties should be judged by the law in effect at the time of their actions 
("transaction-time law")_l' The question is thus not what law is to be ap-
plied but rather what the transaction-time law is. If the decision-time re-
sult is to be reached , it must be because decision-time law has become 
19. The question of whether the court appli es the new rul e to the parti es before it in the Time 2 
case is certainl y rel evant, and at times has been held dispositive. See. e.g. , Harper v. Virg in ia Dep' t of 
Tax ation, 509 U.S. 86, 97-99 ( 1993). Other cases have given it no we ight. See, e.g . Stovall v. 
Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 300-02 (1 967). This iss ue will feature prominently later; in the in te rests of 
smooth exposi tion , I postpone the discuss ion . 
20 . I postpone consideration of the further complication of whether the case is presen ted on direct 
or coll ateral review. 
2 1. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U S. 529, 53 5 (1 99 1). 
22. Earlier retro activity anal ys is inquired whether the purpose of the new rule would be served by 
its application in the case before the Court . See. e.g., Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S 97, 106 
( 197 1 ); Linkletter v. Walker, 38 1 U S. 6 18, 628 (1 965). This bears some sim ilari ty to Brainerd 
Curri e's governmental interest anal ys is of choice-of-l aw questions. See generally LEA BRJLMAYER, 
CONFLICT OF LAWS 47-59 ( 1995). The current approach , focusing on rights parties hold at the time of 
their actions, resembles most cl osely the "vested rights" theory championed by Joseph Beale and 
popular in the earl y twentieth century. See id at 20-25. Beale' s approach is now thoroughl y 
discredited , see id. at 25-41 , which makes it a less than encouraging starting po int fo r modern 
retroactivity juris prudence. 
23. Thi s principle is not se lt~ev id e nt (indeed , I will argue later that it is wrong), but it has st rong 
in tuiti ve appeal, particularl y in the criminal context. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKI NG RJGHTS 
SERI OUSLY 85 (rev . ed . 1978) ("We all agree that it would be wrong to sacrifi ce the rights of an 
in nocent man in the name of some new duty created afte r the event."). The Supreme Co urt also 
adopts it. See, e.g., Slova/1, 388 U.S. at 296 (focusing on the date of conduct). So, too, di d Joseph 
Beale ; indeed, the prin cipl e th at judges do no more than decl are rights th at vested at the time of the 
relevant transac tion was cen tral to hi s conflicts theory. See. e.g, 1 JOSEPH BEALE, CONfLICT Of 
LAWS 38 ( 1935 ) ("[ l]f the judge makes the law he declares, then the law di d not exis t at the 
commiss ion of the alleged wrong ... and the de fe ndant is hel d for a wrong whi ch was not a wrong at 
the time he did it. This is contrary to all conceptions of justice.") . Beale, unl ike Dworkin and the 
Supreme Court, relied on Swifl v. Tyson, 41 U S. ( 16 Pet.) I ( 1842) for thi s ciaim. See id at 39 ("(AJ 
di ffe rence of opinion betwee n the state court and the federal court sitti ng in the state as to the Jaw of 
the state ... is quite in compatibl e with the court maki ng the law.") 
-
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transaction-time law, i.e. , because the new law is effective retroactively. 24 
The Court thus has two options. It may apply the Time 2 decision 
retroactively, thereby changing the law in effect at Time 1. This approach 
reaches the decision-time result although nominally applying transaction-
time law: Party B wins .25 The second possible technique is to announce 
that the Time 2 decision is to have only prospective effect. The new rule 
will apply only to cases filed after the date of the Time 2 decision. The 
law changes at Time 2/6 but the "old" Time 1 law will govern cases filed 
before then: Party A wins. 27 
This model of retroactivity analysis is what I have called the "transac-
tion-time model." One of its consequences, which will tum out to be an 
Achilles heel of sorts, bears mentioning. Suppose the Court reaches the 
first of the two above dispositions and applies the Time 2 decision retro-
actively . This approach changes the law in effect at Time 1. The result is 
that a case finally decided between Time 1 and Time 2 is rendered incor-
rect. The retroactive application of new law injects error into proceedings 
that were error-free when conducted. 
This consequence is a significant source of the difficulties attending 
the question of retroactivity. The question itself, however, is simply 
phrased: How should the Court make the decision between prospective 
and retroactive application? It is a hard question, and it has inspired much 
clever and innovative scholarship. More importantly, it is the wrong 
question. It is a question that cannot be answered and that never should 
have been asked. It exists, I will argue, only because of the Warren 
Court's misunderstanding of earlier decisions, and it implies a theoretical 
framework that is unworkable in principle and in practice . 
A The Historical Origins of Retroactivity: The Question Raised 
The question of retroactivity seems one of obvious importance. What-
ever we think of Holmes ' famous dictum / 8 the life of the common law has 
certainly been change . Changes in judge-made law demand that the courts 
oversee transition between the legal regimes. It might be expected, then , 
that at common law there would be at least some recognition of the diffi-
24. To a certain extent, thi s idea of a fairness-based requirement of transacti on-time law has bee n 
constitutionali zed as a prohibition on ex post facto legislation. See U. S. CONST. art. 1. §§ 9, 10. 
25 . For an exampl e of this approac h. see Griffi th v. Kentudy, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1 987). 
26. Consistency with the Co urt 's co mmitment to transaction-time law would require that the law 
change at the time of the transaction. giving ri se to the Time 2 lawsuit. The Court has. howeve r. 
always treated the date of the deci sion as dispositi ve. See Linkletter v. Walker, 38 1 U.S 6 18. 639 
( 1965). 
27. For an exampl e of thi s approach, see Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson , 404 U.S. 97, I 05-09 ( 1971 ). 
28. OLI VER WENDELL HOLMES, JR , TH E C0!\·1MON LAW I ( 188 1) (' 'The li fe of the law has not 
bee n lo gic. it has been ex peri ence." ) 
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cult issues created by adjudicative retroactivity. Significantly, this is not 
so. The case most often cited as the first example of retroactivity jurispru-
dence, United States v. The Schooner Peggy/9 features legislative, not ad-
judicative, retroactivity, and it disposes of the issue with the truism that a 
court must apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision. (The 
law at issue in The Schooner Peggy specified that it was to have retroac-
tive effect, and the Court applied it. Modem courts, in exempting pre-
enactment transactions from the scope of statutes that do not so specify, 
are of course also applying the law in effect at the time of their decisions; 
the law is interpreted not to reach those transactions.) 
Before the Warren Court, the question of retroactivity was not found 
in the case law, for the simple reason that the concept of retroactivity was 
not there either. As the following sections discuss, the concept had no 
application according to the dominant nineteenth-century understanding of 
the common law. A functional retroactivity-analytically quite distinct 
from the current version-arose as that understanding eroded, and it was 
this idea that was appropriated by the Warren Court and pressed into 
service for a task to which it was not suited. 
I. The Blackstonian lvfodel 
The concept of retroactivity is a relative newcomer to our jurispru-
dence. In 1910, Justice Holmes could write, "Judicial deci s ions have had 
retrospective operation for near a thousand years."30 While Holmes was 
right in terms of result, his description was theoretically slightly off. The 
nineteenth century's received understanding of the judicia l role was en-
capsulated in Blackstone's adage that judges are " not delegated to pro-
nounce a new law, but to mai ntain and expound the old one."31 On this 
declaratory theory, judicial common law decisions reflected, but did not 
embody, the law. The result ofthis conception of law was that a change in 
a court's ruling implied " not that the law is changed, but that it was always 
the same as expounded by the later decision, and that the former decision 
was not, and never had been, the law, and is overruled for that very rea-
son . "32 
This understanding of the nature of law wili, of course, produce the 
uniformly retroactive result to which Holmes adverted. That result is not, 
29 . 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801) . 
30. Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co .. 215 U.S 349,372 (1910) (Ho lmes, J. , dissenting). 
31. 1 WILLIAM BLt\C KSTONE, COMMENTARI ES *69-70 ( 1765-69). 
32. Gel peke v. City of Dubuque , 68 US (I Wall.) 175. 211 {1863) (Miller, J. , dissenting) . See 
Harry Shulman, Retroactive Legislation, 13 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TH E SOCI.Al. SCIENCES 355 , 356 (Alvin 
John so n & Edwin R.A . Seligman eds. , !934) (describin g overruling deci sions as not "new law but an 
application of what is, and theretofore had been , the true law"). 
-
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however, correctly characterized as retrospective application of changed 
law. Instead, the Blackstonian model takes law as a timeless constant, 
always (optimistically) assuming the correctness of the current decision. 
Prior inconsistent deci sions are and a lways were incorrect. 33 The conse-
quence of this idea of law as an apotheosized immutable is that the con-
cept of retroactivity has no place; "old law" and "new law" are necessarily 
the same. 
Changes in law could occur via legislation, of course, and this at least 
provided a chance for the question of retroactivity to raise its head. Doc-
trinally, however, prospectivity was not even nascent; the concept of retro-
activity was simply not di scussed. 34 In the 1801 case of The Schooner 
Peggy, Justice Marshall had stated flatly that "if subsequent to the judg-
ment and before the decision of an appellate court, a law intervenes and 
positively changes the rule which governs, the law must be obeyed, or its 
obligation denied."35 The Schooner Peggy dealt with the effect of legisla-
tive changes. The treaty at is sue specified that it was to have retroactive 
effect and presumably, Marshall would similarly have followed a law dic-
tating that it was to be applied only to post-enactment transactions. The 
Schooner Peggy simply instructs courts to apply the law in effect at the 
time of their dec isions, and this principle had no serious challengers until 
the twentieth century.36 
2. Intimations of Prospectivity 
The Blackstonian mode l, in its full metaphysical glory, is somethin g 
of a legal unicorn. Its transcendently brooding common law does not exist 
now, and never rea ll y did, although it there are still rare reported 
sightings37 and s ideshow s imulacra. 38 It is acceptable within a unifi ed ju-
33. The difference between a Blackstonian model and retroactive appli cation of new law is that 
retroactive appli cati on changes the law (and does so only so far back as the decis io n is ap pli ed 
retroactively). Thi s is a fine di stinction. and unpleasan tl y metaphys ical. but such are the 
conseque nces of the Blackston ian account. 
34. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 6 18, 622-24 (1965). 
35. United Statt:s v. The Schooner Peggy, 5 U S. (I Cranch) 103 , Ill ( 180 I) 
36. Some early cases seem to treat legislat ion as presumptivel y non-retroactive , creatin g a tension 
with the Bradley-Thorpe line of cases discussed supra note 2. See Chicago, Indi anapolis , & 
Loui sv ille Ry. Co. v. Hackett , 228 U.S. 559, 567 (1913) (refusing to address question of possible 
preemption of state statute by post-transacti on fede ral legislati on) . Howeve r, as an interpretive 
presumption, this approach does not really contlict with The Schooner Peggy's admonit ion to app ly 
the law 111 effect at the time of the decisi on; it simply suggests that, absent evidence to the contrary. 
· the law will be read as though it directed courts not to apply it to pre-enactment transacti ons. 
37. In particular. Blackston ian vis ions periodicall y visit Justi ce Scalia. See supra note 5: see also 
ANTONIC: SCALI A, A M,\TTER OF INTERPRET ATION 40 (1997). Of course, Justice Scalia is no t a 
Blackstoni an with respect to common Jaw. and it is only the pervasive willi ngness to br in g a w mmon 
law perspect ive to constitutional in terp retation that makes his originalism in that endeavor appear 
Blackstoni an. 
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dicial system , but the existence of two sets of independent tribunals ex-
pounding the same law tests it severely . 
Such was the case with respect to the concurrent jurisdiction of state 
and federal courts under Swift v. Tyson 39 in the nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries .40 While federal courts deferred to state courts on matters of 
statutory interpretation, "where private rights are to be determined by the 
application of common law rules alone, [the Supreme Court], although 
entertaining for state tribunals the highest respect, does not feel bound by 
their decisions."41 Swift sounded a Blackstonian theme, stating that deci-
sions of courts "are, at most, evidence of what the laws are and are not, of 
themselves, laws,"42 and went on to affirm that state court decisions "can-
not furnish positive rules, or conclusive authority, by which our own 
judgments are to be bound up and governed."43 The existence of distinct 
and overlapping state and federal common law created obvious difficulties 
for parties structuring transactions, but it followed from the idea of a tran-
scendent common law of which judicial decisions were only reflections . 
The fact that settled state court constructions of state statutes were 
authoritative made things easier for private parties but somewhat more 
difficult for metaphysicians. The binding effect of settled state court in-
terpretations made them functionally quite similar to "real" law, but a 
Blackstonian federal judge might still believe that state court decisions 
were, in some sense, wrong. It was in this context that portents of the 
question of retroactivity first appeared.44 
In a series of cases dealing with defaults on municipal bonds, the 
Court declined to follow post-transaction state court decisions on state 
3S. Ronald Dworkin, as discussed infra tex t accompanying notes 171-81 , embraces a 
Blackstonian acco unt as part of his attempt to distinguish himself from positivists. Unlike Justice 
Scalia, he does extend thi s approach to common law. 
39 . 41U S (J 6 Pet)l(J 842). 
40 . Formally , the rcgim~ di scussed below survived until Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomp kins. 304 U.S. 
64 ( 1938) Howeve r, the doctrine was moribund substantiall y earlier. See Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal 
Co , 2 15 U. S. 349, 3 71 ( 191 0) (Holmes, J. , di ssenting). 
41. Chicago v. Robbins, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 418 , 428-29 ( 1862). 
42 . S wift, 41 U.S at 5. It may be useful at this point to di stinguish between two senses of the 
"made" vs. ·'frJllnd" distincti on. In one se nse, as a realist/Biackstonian debate, the questi on is whether 
law ex ists independent of judicial decisions. It is in thi s sense that Swift denies that judges make law, 
and endo rses a pos ition that has almost no modern adherents. See Rich ard H. Fal! on, Jr. & Dani el J. 
Meltze r, NeH• La w, Non-Re!roaclivily, and Conslilutional Remedies, 104 H ARV. L REV. 1731 , 1759 
( 199 1 ). In the other sense, a natural law/positivi sm debate , both sides acce pt that judicial dec isions 
are law; the ques ti on is the degree of constraint on the decisionmaking process . If the first debate is 
dead. th e second is deadly; thi s Article will avoid it as misguided, inconclusive, and unproductiv e. 
43. S wift, 41 US. at 19. 
44. Portents onl y. As I argue below, the foll owing cases feature spurious non-retroacti vity, 
fun ctionall y ident ica l to the real thin g but analyticall y di stinct. 
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statutory issues. Gelpcke v. Dubuque,45 the first in the series, is illustra-
tive. In 1857, the city of Dubuque issued bonds in support of two local 
railroads.46 Between 1853 and 1859, the Iowa Supreme Court repeatedly 
upheld the statute authorizing the issuance against challenges under the 
Iowa Constitution.47 In 1859, however, it reversed itself. 
That settled the issue, presumably, for the Iowa courts: the statute was 
unconst itutional ab initio and the bonds were no good. But what of the 
overlapping system of federal jurisdiction? How should federal courts 
treat the constitutionality of the statute with respect to bonds (like Du-
buque's) issued before the Iowa court's reversal? 
If a question can be imagined, it will usually be litigated , and this one 
proved no exception. Bondholders sued Dubuque in federal court for 
failing to pay coupons on the 1857 bonds . The city defended on the 
grounds that the statute was unconstitutional and the issuance of the bonds 
ultra vires and void. 48 The question for the Supreme Court was whether it 
was bound by a state supreme court decision handed down after the rele-
vant transaction. 49 
The Court answered no. Since federal courts were ordinarily bound by 
state court statutory interpretations, the effect of the Gelpcke decision was 
to refuse retroactive effect to the Iowa Supreme Court's holding of uncon-
stitutionality . Burgess v. Seligman50 and Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co. 51 
similarly refused to be bound by post-transaction state supreme court deci-
sions. Both Burgess and Kuhn , however, featured questions of state law 
unsettled at the time of the transaction rather than state court reversals. 
We might read these decisions as working within the tran sacti on-time 
model set out above and denying retroactive effect to a change in law. 
Justice Holmes' dissent in Kuhn took precisely this perspective, arguing 
that the " fiction " of Swift v. Tyson 52 had been abandoned, that "dec isions 
of state courts of last resort make law for the state," and hence that "a 
change of judicial decision after a contract has been made on the fa ith of 
an earlier one the other way is a change of the law."53 Holmes character-
ized Gelpcke and other municipal bond cases as resting " not on the 
45 . 6SUS( 1Wa11)!75( 1863). 
46. See id at 177-78 . 
47. See id at 179-87. 
48. See id at 179. 
49 . See id at 179-80. 
50. 107 U.S . 20 (1883). 
5i. 215 U.S . 349 (1910). At iss ue in Kuhn was not statutory interpretati on but common law. The 
Co urt. howevt:r, conced ed that a settled pattern of state court dec isions of the issue would create a 
·' ruic of property" with the binding effect of statutory interpreta tions. See id at 360. 
52. 4 1 U.S ( 16 Pet.) I ( 1842), overruled by Eric R.R. Co. v. Tompkins. 304 U.S. 64 ( 1938) 
53. ld at 371 (Holmes. J. disse nting) . 
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grounds that this court agreed with the first decision , but on the ground 
that the state decision made law for the state, and therefore should be 
given only a prospective operation when contracts had been entered into 
under the law as earlier declared."54 Because Kuhn dealt with unsettled 
law, Holmes argued that the state court decision should be authoritati ve 
and retroactive. " I know of no authority in this court to say that, 111 gen-
eral, state court decisions shall make law only for the future."" 
Holmes, as usual, was slightly ahead of his time . Although he had 
only to wait for the assertion of that authority, it was not being exercised 
by hi s colleagues . The Gelpcke Court wavers in its characterization of its 
reasoning. In some places it suggests that it refuses to follow the latest 
Iowa decision because it should be prospective: "However we may regard 
the late case in Iowa as affecting the future , it can have no effect upon the 
past." 56 In others it suggests that the later decision is wrong: "The earlier 
decisions, we think, are sustained by reason and authority."57 Burgess and 
Kuhn are somewhat clearer. Those Courts refuse to be bound by inter-
vening state deci sions not because the decisions are prospective only but 
because they are not authoritative, and the decisions are not authoritative 
because of the independence of the federal judiciary from state decisions 
not representing settled rules. 58 This independence relies on the Swift idea 
that decisions are not law but merely evidence of it. In Burgess, notably, 
the state court decisions arose out of the same transaction being litigated in 
federal court; the state courts had thus declared the law governing that 
very transaction. ' 9 The Court's decision was driven by its understanding 
54. ld 
55. ld at 372. 
56. Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 68 U.S. (I Wall.) I75, 206 (1 863 ). lfwe tah: e this remark to be referring 
to the effect of the deci sion on what the law was, then it so unds like an assertion of prospectivity: if 
we understana it as referring to what th e federal court is bound by. it tits more neatly within a 
Bl ackstonian model. Th e latter is the better readin g; the Court claims that whil e the Iowa 
interpretation might in the future become authoritative over federal courts (by attaining, through 
repetition, the status of se ttled adjudication), it is not now. Interestingly, Justice Scali a, who merits 
the tepidly contested di stinction of bein g th e greatest Ji vin g constitutional Blackstonian. was to ech(> 
the Gelpcke Court in his concurrence in American Trucking Ass 'ns v. Smith , 496 U.S . I 67, 2 02-0~ 
( 1990) (Scalia, J , concurring). See infra notes 155-57 and accompanying text. justi ce O'Co nnor. 
who does not ri val him in this res pect, tried a simil ar tack with less success in James B. Beam 
Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 50 I U.S 529. 55 0-52 (I 99 I) (O 'Connor. J.. dissenting). See infra note 27 I. 
57. Gelpcke is a multi faceted case with co nstituti onai ove nones: argu ab ly, fo ll owin g the last Iowa 
court deci sion and voiding the bonds would have vi olated the federal constitution by impairing 
contracts valid when formed. (There is. of course. the facile response that if the dec isic1n is 
retroactive, the contracts were not valid wh en form ed. an argument th at has succeed ed at least once. 
See Tid al Oil Co. v. Fl anagan , 263 U.S. 444 ( 1924)) . 
5S. See Burgess v. Se li gman. I 07 US 20. 32-34 ( ! 883 ) 
59. See id at 35. The image of fed eral co urts ignorin g the pronoun ce ments of state co ur1s as to 
state law governing the precise tran sacti ons being liti gated in federal court is striking. The proof that 
th ose who do not learn from history are doo med to repeat it came when the same scene was re-enacted 
I 
1999] THE MYTH OF ADJUDICATIVE RETROACTIVITY 1087 
not of "old law" or "new law," but of "true law."60 The question it sought 
to answer was not "What was the governing law at the time of this trans-
action?" but simply "What is the governing law?" 
The fact that federal courts were bound only by settled state court de-
cisional rules allowed for functional prospectivity. Until a state court 's 
changed interpretation represented a settled rule, federal courts could dis-
regard it, even for post-decision transactions. But the issue was clearly 
one of authority, not of retroactivity. 61 It was not until fifty years later that 
Burgess, Kuhn, and Gelpcke would be seen through the lens of retroactiv-
ity jurisprudence-and then they would not be seen well. 
3. The Birth of (Non) retroactivity: The Warren Court's Mistake 
The strong Blackstonian position of Swift v. Tyson, that judicial deci-
sions were merely evidence of an independent and unchanging common 
law, appears implausible to the modern eye. It was not much more popu-
lar with even its near contemporaries.62 With the recognition that courts 
make law came the possibility of prospective overruling. Academics had 
begun to discuss the idea by the turn of the century,63 and in the 1932 case 
of Great Northern Railway Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., the Su-
preme Court approved the practice as constitutionally legitimate in state 
within the federal judicial system under Stovall v. Denno. 388 U.S . 293 ( 1967). See infra notes 91-93 
and accompanying text. 
60. See Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co, 3 11 U.S. 53 8, 540-41 & nn .9-1 0 ( 1941) 
(describing Burgess and Kuhn as relying on federal independence rather than non-retroactivity) . 
61 . Indeed , Celpcke's most memorable lines are a ringing, if overheated. affirmati on of federal 
independence : "We shall never immolate truth. justice, and the law because a State tribunal has 
erected the altar and decreed the sacrifice .·· Celpcke. 68 U.S. at 206-07. 
62. See, e.g, W.J. Adams, Jr. . Comtilutional Law-Proteclion of Rights Acquired in Reliance on 
Overruled Decision, II N.C. L. REv. 323, 329 ( 1933) (characterizing the Blackston ian account as 
''antiqu ated dogma and useless fiction'') ; Charles E. Carpenter, Decisions and the Common Law. 17 
COLUM. L. REV 593 ( 19 17) (arguing that courts make law). The Carpenter article is interes ting as an 
early example of the trans action-time model. Carpenter argues for the principle that parties should b~ 
govern .:d by the law in effect at the time of their actions , which he identifies with the doctrine that 
courts make law. See id at 604 ("If the decisions of the courts make the law, the over-ruling dec ision 
need have no retroactive operation beyond that involved in the decision itse lf, because the over-ruling 
decision merely changes the law from the time it is made and leaves the law prior to that time 
unchanged."). But thi s is a too-fac ile ass imilation of judicial to legislative changes in law. For one 
thing, it takes the apparently incoherent position (later adopted by the Supreme Court in Linkletter v. 
Walker, 38 1 U.S. 618.639 (1965)) that appl ying transaction -time law requires the cou rt to look to the 
latest decision iss ued at the time of the transaction. The obv ious problem with this procedure is th at if 
the law-changing deci sion is applying transacti on-time law (retro ac tively altered or not), the changed 
law is held effective as of the date of that transaction . Thus, the relevant dates are dates of 
transactions, not decisions. 
63 . See Bery l Levy, Realist Jurisprude nce and Prospective Overruling, I 09 U. PA. L. REV. I , 7-8 
( 1960) (attributing the first scholarl y endorsement of pros pecti ve overruling to a 19 17 speech by 
George F. Canfi eld and noting that state co urts had empl oyed the technique even as early as the late-
nineteenth century). 
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courts. 64 Characterizing the Blackstonian account as "ancient dogma," 
Justice Cardozo wrote, "A state in defining the limits of adherence to 
precedent may make a choice for itself between the principle of forward 
operation and that of relation back. It may say that decisions of its highest 
court, though later overruled, are law nonetheless for intermediate trans-
actions."65 
Well before Erie, in other words, the spirit of the law had begun to slip 
into the body of judicial decisions. With the Erie decision, Swift v. Tyson 
was explicitly overruled and the incarnation was complete. The common 
law thus descended from the heavens was plainly mortal. As courts over-
ruled themselves, Jaw could change; law could die. With the possibility of 
law-changing decisions, the false unity of the Blackstonian model dis-
solved. Transaction-time and decision-time law became recognizable as 
clearly distinct entities. 
Because the practice under the Blackstonian understanding was to give 
automatic effect to later statements of the law, the principle of simply ap-
plying decision-time law had a significant advantage . Already enshrined 
in Marshall ' s The Schooner Peggy opinion, it quickly extended its reach to 
law-changing decisions. If the operative rule is simply to apply current 
law, the concept of retroactivity has no role to play, and Supreme Court 
decisions through the 1940s, relying heavily on The Schooner Peggy, ap-
plied decision-time law without discussion in cases where changes were 
wrought by intervening legislation66 or decisions.67 Vandenbark v. Owens-
Illinois Glass Co68 explicitly repudiated Burgess and Kuhn, holding that 
federal courts "should conform their orders to the state law as of the time 
of the entry. Intervening and conflicting decisions will thus cause the re-
versal of judgments which were correct when entered."69 Vandenbark 
clearly follows The Schooner Peggy in dictating that current law be ap-
plied. Like The Schooner Peggy, however, it holds out the possibility of 
64. 287 U.S. 358 (1932). It has been argued that Sunburst does not speak to prospectivity of 
constituti onal decisions. See James B. Haddad, The Finality Distinction in Supreme Court 
Retroactivity Analysis: An Inadequate Surrogate for Modification of the Scope of Federal Habeas 
Corpus, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1062, 1065-66 (1984) . Levy sugges ts that Cardozo 's interest in 
prospectiv ity stemmed from a retroact ive increase in co urse requiremen ts that Columbia Law School 
had imposed whil e Cardozo was a student. Refus ing to submit. he never rece ived a law degree. See 
Levy, supra note 63, at I 0 n.31. 
65. Sunburst, 287 U.S . at 363. 
66. See. e.g., Carpenter v. Wabash Ry. Co., 309 U. S. 23 (1940) . Carpenter, like The Schooner 
Peggy, is best understood as standing for dec ision -t ime law rather th an decis ion-time re sult . The 
statute at issue explicitl y provided fo r applica tion to cases " now ... pending in any court of the 
United States." !d. at 27 . 
67. See, e.g, Vandenbark v. Owens-Illino is Glass Co. 3 11 U.S. 538 ( 1940). 
68. ld 
69. Jd at 543 . 
I 
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prospective results. If a state court ruled that its decis ion should be ap-
plied only prospectively, as Sunburst had held it might, Vandenbark would 
presumably require federal courts to follow this prescription. 
Although the concept of prospectivity had been considered by the Su-
preme Court in 1932, it took substantially longer for the transaction-time 
model to w in a place in its opinions. There were flickers of prospectivity 
in the 1950s/0 but it was not until the late 1960s that these sparks found 
tinder. It was then that the Court found a need to engage in prospective 
overruling; it was then that the question of retroactivity truly emerged. 
The Warren Court 's revolutionary changes in criminal procedure pro-
duced an equally revolutionary change in retroactivity analysis. The War-
ren Court's first sustained discussion of retroactivity came in Linkletter v. 
Walker. 71 That case posed the question of retroactive application of Mapp 
v. Ohio,72 which had held the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule appli-
cable to the States.73 The rule announced in Mapp had been applied in that 
case, and to cases pending on direct review at the time of the Mapp deci-
sion. 74 The issue for the Linkletter Court was thus whether the Mapp rule 
could be invoked on habeas petitions by plaintiffs whose convictions had 
become final before the Mapp decision .75 
The Court began with a historical discuss ion of the Blackstonian 
model and its erosion. It attributed to Austin a rival conception of law on 
which "judges do in fact do something more than discover law; they make 
it interstiti ally."76 Locating the Austinian model in cases such as Gelpcke 
70. See. e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956) (Frankfurter, J , concurring); Mosser v. 
Darrow, 341 U.S. 267 ,275 (1951) (Black, J , dissenting) . 
71. 38 1 U.S 618 (1965). In England v. Louisiana Sta te Board oj:'vfedical Examiners , 37 5 U.S . 
411 ( 1964). the Court had , wi thout comment, refused to apply its holding to the parties before it. 
Although Linkletter re li ed on England for the proposition that there was no Article Ill barrier to pure 
prospectivity , England offers only an inference from silence. The Linkletter Court' s carefully phrased 
reference to England, " [N]o doubt was expressed of our power under Article III ," Linkletter v. 
Walker, 381 U.S 618,622 n.3 (1965), is tellingly precise : nothing was expressed at aiL 
72. 367 U .S. 643 (196 1). 
73. See id at 657. 
74 . See, e.g, Ker v. State ofCalifomia, 374 U.S. 23 (1964). 
75 . The question of how the Warren Court' s new rul es would app ly to habe as petitioners had not 
gone unnoticed . See. e.g, Pau l M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for 
State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 , 527 n.220 (1963) (noting the "baffl ing problem" of habe as 
and retroactivity) . 
76. Linkletter, 381 U. S. at 623 -24. Oddly, the Court concluded that on the Austin ian model , 
earlier decision s that are overrul ed were wrongly decided . This conclusi on follow s directly from the 
Blackstonian model , and in fact the Austinian view allows one to avo id it by invoking the concept of 
changed law . Cj Paul J. Mishkin, Fore word The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process 
ofTime and Law, 79 H ARV . L. REV. 56, 58 (1965) (stating that after begi nning with Blackstone, ·'the 
opini on countcred~somewhat unconventionall y- w ith Austin" ). The Court approached the idea th at 
earlier decisions were correct when de cided by characteri z ing them as ''exist ing juridical fact[s ] until 
overruled," which produces the same result. Linkletter, 38 i US at 624. 
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and Sunburst, it argued that earlier decisions were not erased by later over-
rulings . From this doctrine and other cases, including The Schooner 
Peggy and Vandenbark, it derived the propositions "(1) that a change in 
law will be given effect while a case is on direct review ... and (2) that 
the effect of the subsequent ruling of invalidity on prior final judgments 
when collaterally attacked is subject to no set 'principle of absolute retro-
active invalidity ' but depends upon a consideration [of fairness and pol-
icy]."77 "[I]n appropriate cases," it concluded, "the Court may in the inter-
est of justice make the rule prospective."78 
To decide whether the rule should be applied prospectively, the Court 
created a three-factor test of purpose, reliance, and effect. Because the 
purpose of the Mapp rule was not to exclude unconstitutionally obtained 
evidence but to deter unconstitutional searches, retroactive application of 
Mapp to habeas petitions would not further the purpose of the rule. This 
fact, coupled with the States' reliance on the earlier Woifrule and the dev-
astating (from the States' perspective) effect of application of Mapp to 
habeas petitions, led the Court to conclude that non-retroactivity was the 
sounder course. 
The Linkletter analysis is deeply unsatisfying. First, it seriously mis-
reads Gelpcke, Kuhn, and Vandenbark; consequently, it draws upon a his-
torical tradition that does not exist 79 Second, it blithely assumes that Sun-
burst can be applied to federal courts despite the federal prohibition on 
advisory opinions. 80 Most significantly, it draws a distinction between 
cases on direct review and those in which a judgment is collaterally at-
tacked that is simply impossible to justify within its own theoretical 
model. 81 Linkletter's petition (and Justice Black's dissent) made the obvi-
ous argument that the search in his case had occurred after the search in 
77. Linkleller, 381 U.S. at 627. 
78. ld at 628. 
79. Those cases are concerned with authority, not retroactivity--except to the extent that 
Vandenbark embodies the principle that courts must apply current law. Linkleller may also misread 
Sunburst. See Haddad, supra note 64, at I 063-64. 
80. Sunburst dealt with prospectivity in state courts, which are often permitted to issue advisory 
opinions . Whether a prospective decision is advisory was thus not addressed. 
81 In fact, the Court made no real attempt to justify it. The opinion discusses the general 
tendency against prospectivity , notes some cases that apparently suggest prospectivity is permissible, 
and mysterious ly concludes that ·' under our cases'' the two categories arc to be treated differently. 
Linkleller, 381 U.S. at 627. Of course, no case mentioned in Linkletter had even discussed 
diffe rentiating between direct co llateral review~though to be fair , this is quite likely a consequence 
of the fact that the cases had not had to deal with much collateral review. The Linkle tter Cou rt, by 
contrast, found itself near the high-water mark of federal habeas corp us review of state judgments. 
See, e.g, Fay v. Noia, 3 72 U S. 391 (1963), overruled by Wainwri gh t v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 ( 1977). 
But the problem remains: simpl y characterizing intermediate deci s ions as "ex isting juridical fact[s] 
until overrul ed" does not explain why the effects of the ir existence should depend on the procedural 
posture of a case. Linkletter, 38 1 U.S. at 624 . 
I 
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Afapp 82 The application of the Mapp rule to Mapp herself implied that, at 
the time of that search, the exclusionary rule applied to the States. Thus it 
would seem that it must necessarily have applied at the time of the later 
search in LinkletterY But even granting that the date of the Mapp decision 
is the relevant law-changing moment, the Court ' s approach is incoherent. 
Its oddity has provoked substantial commentary,84 but it bears repeat-
ing. Con sider two defendants implicated by evidence seized in a single 
invalid search. 85 They are tried separately; both proceed to judgment at the 
same time. But while one judgment becomes final , the defendant in the 
other case avails himself of a lengthy appellate review, which is still on-
going when Mapp is decided. When the defendants seek relief on the ba-
sis of Mapp, the result will depend simply on whether or not the convic-
tion has become final : the habeas petitioner will be told that there was no 
error in the conduct of his trial, and the defendant whose case comes on 
direct review will reap the benefit of Mapp. The evidence is inadmissible 
as to one but not as to the other, though it is fruit of the same search and 
may, indeed, be the same evidence. 
The Linkletter result was almost inevitable . Allowing habeas petition-
ers to benefit from the Mapp rule would have produced an avalanche of 
habeas petitions and new trials. The burden on state criminal justice sys-
tems would have been intolerable; apart from the administrative cost of 
ne\v trial s, the states would have been forced to reassemble evidence and 
\vitnesses for cases whose original trials were now years in the past. 86 But 
the rationale, or lack thereof, provoked fierce criticism. 87 Clearly, retroac-
tivity jurisprudence could not rest where Linkletter had placed it. 
82. See Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 641-42 (Black, J., dissentin g). 
83. The Court dealt with this contention by di sagreeing: "The date of the seizure in Mapp has no 
legal significance It was the j ud gment of thi s Court that changed the rule , and the date of that 
opinion is the crucial date. In the light of the cases of this Court , this is the better cutoff time'' !d. at 
639. The Court then cited The Schooner Peggy, putting an odd twi st on a cryptic argument. 
84 . See, e. g, Francis X Bcytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity. A Critique and a Proposal, 61 
VA. L. REV. 1557, 1565-66 (1 975); Thomas S. Currier, Time and Change in Judge-Alade La w 
Prospec1ive Overruling, 51 VA. L REv. 20 I, 20 1-04 ( 1965); James B. Haddad, " Retroactivity Should 
be Rethought.· " A Call for the End of the Linkletter Doctrine, 60 J. CRJ M. L & CRIMINOLOGY 41 7 
( 1969); Herman Schwartz, Retroactivity. Reliability, and Due Process: A Reply to Prof essor Mishkin, 
33 U. CH I. L REv. 7 19, 764 (1 966) 
85. A more extensive ··melodrama" based on thi s hypotheti cal is offered by Curri er. See Currier, 
supra note 84, at 201-04. 
86. See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S . 667 , 69 1 (1971 ) (Harl an, J , concurring) . 
87. See so urces cited supra note 84. Even Paul Mishkin , sympathetic to the Linkleller result , 
fa ui ted the Court for its crypti c anal ysis and unnecessary abandonment of the Blackstoni an 
dec laratory mode l. Discuss ing the sy mboli c value of the declaratory theory, Mishkin commented, " If 
the view be in part a myth , it is a myth by which we live and which can be sacrificed only at 
sub stanti al cost." Mishkin , supra note 76, at 62-63 
1092 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:1075 
B. Modern Retroactivity Jurisprudence: The Question Confronted 
1 . Criminal Procedure 
Unable to distinguish between habeas petitions and direct review, yet 
unwilling to allow uniform retroactive application of new constitutional 
rules, the Court in Stovall v. Denno88 moved in the opposite direction. 
New rules had to be applied in the cases in which they were announced, 
lest constitutional adjudications "stand as mere dictum,"89 but their appli-
cation to other cases, those on direct review and those presented on habeas 
petitions alike, would be judged by Linkletter's purpose-reliance-effect 
triad. 90 Employing these factors, Stovall held that the new rule requiring 
the presence of counsel at exhibitions of accused parties to identifying 
witnesses would be applied only in the case in which it was announced. 
"Selective prospectivity" was born. 
The Stovall regime of selective prospectivity achieved the goal of uni-
fying the treatment of direct and collateral review, but it was a Pyrrhic 
victory. Selective prospectivity compounded the problems of the Linklet-
ter approach. Linkletter's line between direct and collateral review had 
drawn a distinction without a difference, but selective prospectivity cre-
ated differences without distinctions. The application of a rule to one de-
fendant but not another, who might have participated in the same crime 
and been tried separately, was not merely unfair but openly incoherent 
when both cases came to the Court in the same procedural posture. If new 
law governed one case, for whatever reasons, it should govern the other, 
for precisely the same reasons. Legally correct results do not become in-
correct by reason of iteration. 91 The Stovall Court's justification for selec-
tive prospectivity, adherence to "sound policies of decision-making,"92 is 
somewhat ironic in the face of Stovall's results.93 By refusing to apply in a 
88. 388 U.S. 293 (1967). 
89. ld at 301. On the transaction-time model , the concern is real, si nce the court is not declaring 
the rights of the parties before it but rather announcing how future cases will be decided. 
90. See id at 300. Under Stovall, resu lts turned no longer on finality but rather on whether the 
conduct in question had occurred before or after the law-changing decision . 
91. If the fact of announcing a new rule is a relevant factor in the Co urt 's decisi onmaking process, 
this may not be true. For a suggestion that the Court 's function of norm-promul gation sho uld be 
primary, see Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword· The Forms of Justice, 93 
HARY. L. REv. I (1979) . Subsequent applications of new rules do not have the virtue of being 
vehicles for norm-promul gation . Individual litigants, however, certainly have a claim to sec justice 
done on the merits of their individual cases , and it is true that this concepti on of justice requires 
co nsi stency. 
92. Stovall, 388 U.S . at 301. 
93. One particularly unfortunate result of the new law/old law dichotomy was the consequent 
impli cation that the new rule was not the best reading of precedent but rather a legislative-style 
change effected by the will of the Court. See Williams v. United States, 401 U.S 667. 70 1 (1967) 
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subsequent case the law it had announced governed the particular transac-
tion at issue, Stovall achieved the all-but-impossible task of reproducing 
within the federal system the peculiar inconsistency that Swift v. Tyson had 
permitted between state and federal courts. 
Although the Linkletter/Stovall regime survived well past the Warren 
Court, support was not unanimous even in its heyday. It was initially 
backed both by Justices who saw in non-retroactivity a means to imple-
ment desired reforms without inflicting unacceptable disruption on the 
criminal justice system and by those who disagreed with the reforms and 
accepted non-retroactivity as a way to limit their effect. The diverse bases 
for support reflected the underlying tensions in the doctrine. While selec-
tive prospectivity was hard to accept in theory, full retroactivity was im-
possible in practice. Yet distinguishing between cases on direct review 
and those presented by habeas petitions had proved impossible to do in a 
principled way within the transaction-time model. 94 
In a series of concurrences and dissents beginning in 1969,95 Justice 
Harlan made a sustained attempt to craft a principled doctrine. He began 
with the premise that the Court's duty was to decide cases according to its 
best understanding of the law.96 It followed that selective prospectivity 
was unacceptable. "Simply fishing one case from the stream of appellate 
review, using it as a vehicle for pronouncing new constitutional standards, 
and then permitting a stream of similar cases subsequently to flow by un-
affected by that new rule constitute an indefensible departure from this 
model of judicial review."97 New constitutional rules must therefore be 
applied to all cases on direct review. 98 
Habeas petitions presented different issues. Much as the Warren 
Court had in refusing to apply retroactively its expansions of the exclu-
sionary rule, Justice Harlan looked to the purpose of the writ of habeas 
corpus as applied by the Warren Court. 99 Finding it to serve a similar de-
(Harian. J., dissenting) ("[T]he retroactivity doctrine announced today bespeaks more considerations 
of policy than of legal principle."); Mishkin, supra note 76, at 65 ("'ndeed, the conscious 
confrontation of the question of an effective date ... smacks of the legislative process."). The Warren 
Court's new rules thus took on a more starkly legislative cast. The Court's non-retroactive results 
suggested this legislative aspect, but it was not necessary to enshrine it in the theory. 
94. See Stovall. 388 U.S. at 300. 
95. See Williams, 40 I U.S. at 70 I; Elkanich v United States, 40 I U.S. 667 ( 1971) (Harlan, J , 
concurring); Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 (1971) (Harlan, l, concurring); Desist v United 
States. 394 U.S. 244,256 (1969) (Harlan, l, dissenting). 
96. See Williams, 401 US at 677-80; Desisl, 394 US at 258-59. 
97. Williams. 401 US. at 679. 
98. See Desist, 394 U.S. at 258. 
99. Justice Harlan addressed the Warren Court's conception of habeas corpus out of necessity, 
since his views that it "constitute[ d] an indefensible departure both from the historical principles 
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terrent function, "as a necessary additional incentive for trial and appellate 
courts throughout the land to conduct their proceedings in a manner con-
sistent with established constitutional standards," 100 he similarly concluded 
that application of decision-time law was not necessary to its purpose. 
Justice Harlan thus concluded that with few exceptions, the law ap-
plied on habeas petitions should be the law in effect at the time of the ini-
tial trial. 101 His view of the scope of the required exceptions changed 
slightly over time . Initially, he proposed that '" new' constitutional rules 
which significantly improve the pre-existing fact-finding procedures are to 
be retroactively applied on habeas," since one of the purposes of the ha-
beas writ was to "assure that no man has been convicted under a procedure 
which creates an impermissibly large risk that the innocent will be con-
victed."102 This exception was later abandoned in favor of a class defined 
by reference to the category of procedures " implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty . " 103 Justice Harlan ' s second exception was for rules " that 
place, as a matter of constitutional interpretation, certain kinds of primary, 
private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making 
authority to proscribe . . .. " 104 
Reaching a different result in cases on direct review and those before 
the Court on petitions for habeas corpus was obviously attractive, as it 
would allow the Court to abandon the embarrass ing doctrine of selective 
prospectivity without causing prison doors to swing too wide. Justi ce 
Harlan's distinction, however, had more to do with his different concep-
tion of habeas corpus than a new theory of retroactivity: " As regards cases 
coming here on collateral review, the problem of retroactivity is in truth 
none other than one of resettling the limits of the reach of the Great Writ , 
which under the recent decisions of this Court has been given almost 
boundless sweep."105 He recommended different treatment simply in order 
to respect the finality of prior adjudications. 106 This reliance on finality did 
not provide a principled distinction easy to incorporate into the exist ing 
which defined the scope of the 'Great Writ ' and from the principles of federali sm whi ch have formed 
the bedrock of our constituti onal devel opment," had not prevail ed. Jd at 262. 
100. Jd at 262-63. The parall els between the treatm en t of habeas petitions and th at of the 
exclusionary rule are striking. See Butler v. McKell ar. 494 U.S . 407, 414 ( 1990); Penry v. Lynaugh. 
492 U.S. 302,351 (1989) (Scali a, J , concurring). 
101. See Desist, 394 U. S. at 263. 
I 02. /d. at 262. 
103. Palko v. Connecti cut, 302 U.S. 3 19, 325 ( 1937). Justi ce Harlan' s example of thi s so rt of 
procedure was the ri ght to coun sel es tab li shed in Gideon v. Wainwrighl, 3 72 U S 33 5 ( 1963 ). 
104. Willi ams v. United States, 40 1 US. 667 . 692 (1 97 1) (Harl an. J , di ssenti ng) . 
105. Jd at 701-02. 
I 06. See id at 690. 
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jurisprudence of retroactivity.' 07 
Though not perfect, Justice Harlan's approach was more attractive 
than the selective prospectivity of Stovall, and it exerted a gravitational 
pull. After Desist, the Court's attempt to differentiate habeas petitions 
from direct review followed a tortured path towards Justice Harlan's re-
sults. In Hankerson v. North Carolina, 108 Justice White suggested in a 
footnote that the impact of retroactive application to habeas cases might 
be mitigated by the fact that defense lawyers were unlikely to make ob-
jections obviously futile under settled law: "The States, if they wish, 
may be able to insulate past convictions by enforcing the normal and 
valid rule that failure to object ... is a waiver of any claim of error." 109 
This idea received qualified endorsement in Engle v. Isaac, 110 a case in 
which the Court rejected the argument that novelty excused a procedural 
default that would otherwise bar the raising of a claim on a habeas peti-
tion.'" 
The Hankerson-Engle approach offered a clever, if heartless, method 
of effectively denying retroactive relief to habeas petitioners. 112 Its ulti-
mate efficacy was never tested, however, because majority support 
emerged for the more direct approach advocated by Justice Harlan. In the 
1987 case of Griffith v. Kentucky, 113 the Court abandoned the Linkletter-
Stovall analysis and accepted Justice Harlan's argument that "new rules" 
of criminal procedure must be applied retroactively to all cases pending on 
direct review. 114 Two years later, in Teague v. Lane, 115 the Court adopted 
Justice Harlan's approach to collateral attack as well: "Unless they fall 
I 07. The most significant problem with a reliance on finality is that the finality interest is always 
present in a collateral attack. Finality, by itself, offers no reason to distinguish between challenges 
relying on old law and those urging the application of new law. See infra Part !!I.A. 
108. 432 U.S. 233 (1977). 
109. Jd at 244 n.8 (citation omitted). 
II 0. 456 U.S. I 07 ( J 982). 
J J J. See id. at J 30-3 J. The Engle Court reserved judgment on the question of whether novelty 
could ever establish cause for failure to object, reasoning that the grounds for the objection were 
available to petitioners at the time of trial. 
112. The Hankerson-Engle approach was not without its critics. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 
12, 26 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("We should not indulge in the fiction that the law now 
announced has always been the law and, therefore, that those who did not avail themseives of it 
waived their rights.''). 
113. 479 U.S. 314 (1987). The progress towards Griffith was also a gradual one. See Shea v. 
Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51 (1985) (applying Johnson to new Fifth Amendment rules); United States v. 
Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 (1982) (limiting non-retroactivity on direct review to new rules constituting 
"clear breaks" with precedent). 
114. Although the Griffith Court quoted Justice Harlan's opinions with approval, it followed him at 
the level of result rather than th?.t of theoretical model. See infra notes 252-57 and accompanying 
text. 
115. 489US288(1989). 
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within an exception to the general rule, new constitutional rules of crimi-
nal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become 
final before the new rules are announced." 116 
For all its claimed fidelity, the Teague opinion departed from Justice 
Harlan's vision in two respects. First, it modified his suggested exceptions 
to the general rule. While adopting wholesale the principle that changes in 
law should be applied if they placed "primary private individual conduct 
beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe," 117 it 
combined the two versions of the second exception he had proposed in 
Desist and Mackey. New rules would be applied only if they both required 
observance of procedures implicit in the concept of ordered liberty and 
contributed to the accuracy of the verdict. The Court suggested that the 
intersection ofthese categories would be extremely narrow. 118 
The second departure from the Harlan model was more significant. 
The Teague Court stated that recognition of the new rule urged by the pe-
titioner would require its application to his case, lest "constitutional adju-
dications ... stand as mere dictum." 119 Yet the restrictions it had previ-
ously set forth would preclude application in other habeas cases. Since 
selective prospectivity "hardly comports with the ideal of 'administration 
of justice with an even hand, "' 120 the Court concluded that the best practice 
was to "refuse to announce a new rule in a given case unless the rule 
would be applied retroactively to the defendant in the case and to all others 
similarly situated." 121 
This reasoning was entirely consistent with Justice Harlan's position . 
Teague's difference lies in its conception of newness. 122 Because Justice 
Harlan adhered to a model of adjudication on which "many, though not all, 
of this Court's constitutional decisions are grounded upon fundamental 
principles whose content does not change dramatically from year to year, 
but whose meanings are altered slowly and subtly as generation succeeds 
generation," 123 he saw a relatively small class of cases as announcing rules 
sufficiently new to bar application on habeas petitions. The current Court, 
116. /dat310. 
!!7. ld at 311 (citation omitted). 
118. Indeed, since Teague, no such rule has been discovered. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL .. 
HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDER..'\L SYSTEM 1409 (4th ed. !996) 
!19. Teague, 489 U.S at 315 (quoting Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301 (1967)) 
120. !d. (quoting Desist v United States, 394 U.S. 244,255 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting)). 
121. /d.at316. 
122. See id at 301 (stating that ··a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by 
precedent"). 
123. ld at 263. 
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by contrast, has embraced a very broad conception of new law. 124 The 
current retroactivity jurisprudence in criminal law has thus moved towards 
bright-line rules-retroactivity on direct but not collateral review-and 
away from the underdetennined Linkletter balancing. Its distinction be-
tween direct and collateral review, and its consistent focus on transaction-
time law, however, brand it as Linkletter's intellectual descendant and, 
more significantly, as a product of the transaction-time model. 125 
2. Statutes of Limitations 
The retroactivity jurisprudence developed in the criminal context did 
not carry over to civil actions of its own force. In Chevron Oil Co. v. Hu-
son, 126 however, the Court adopted an approach very similar to the Lin-
kletter analysis. Chevron arose from a personal injury suit under the Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act. 127 When the case was filed, circuit precedent 
held that admiralty law, including the equitable doctrine of laches, applied 
to such claims. While pretrial discovery was underway in the district 
court, however, the Supreme Court decided Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty 
and Surety Co., 128 holding that state statutes of limitations were to be ab-
sorbed and applied as federal law under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands 
Act. 129 Under the Lousiana one-year statute of limitations for personal 
injury suits, Huson's suit was time-barred two years before it was filed, 
and the district court accordingly granted summary judgment against 
him. 130 
The Supreme Court disagreed. Citing its criminal law precedents as 
well as a number of civil non-retroactivity cases, it set forth a three-factor 
test related to the Linkletter analysis. The first element was a threshold 
determination that the decision to be applied non-retroactively "estab-
124. See. e.g., Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990); see generally Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 
42, at 1748 (stating that "(t]he conception of legal newness implicit in Teague and its progeny is 
difficult to reconcile with the conception of the judicial role embraced by Justice Harlan"). The 
current Court's broad conception of new law may be understood in part as an attempt to limit the 
reach of habeas petitions. It is also, I believe, a consequence in part of the dominance of the 
transaction-time model. Because this model suggests that judicial lawmaking is akin to legislative 
lawmaking, it makes even incremental changes in law appear discretionary innovations rather than 
logical extensions of precedent. While this conception may have the desired result of reducing the 
scope of habeas, it undermines the legitimacy of judicial review. 
125. The markers of the transaction-time model are Griffith's insistence on applying new law 
retroactively-in order to change the law that governed at the time of the transaction-and Teague's 
admission that finality is the best justification that can be offered for differential treatment of direct 
and collateral review. See infra notes 242-45 and accompanying text. 
126. 404US97(1971) 
127. 43 us c.~~ 1331-1356. 
128. 395 U.S. 352 (1970) 
129. See id at 355 (referring to 43 U.S.C ~~ 1331-1356) 
130. See Chevron, 404 U.S at 99. 
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lish(ed] a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent .. 
. or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not 
clearly foreshadowed. " 13 1 The second factor absorbed the Linkletter crite-
ria, condensing them into an analysis of the purpose of the new rule . The 
third was a balancing of equities. 132 
Based on this analysis, the Court concluded that the Rodrigue rule 
should not be applied retroactively. The Rodrigue decision had overruled 
clear circuit precedent; the purpose of the rule was to aid injured employ-
ees like Huson ; and holding Huson to have "s lept on his rights" when he 
could not have known that state law applied would be inequitable. 133 
The three-factor Chevron test sprang from the same principles ani-
mating the Linkletter analysis. The similarity between criminal and civil 
contexts was not surprising; Linkletter had drawn upon civil precedents 
and stated that historically " no distinction was drawn between civil and 
crimina! litigation .... " 134 Notwithstanding Linkletter's observation, this 
uniformity did not persist. In 1987, the Court decided Griffith v. Kentucky, 
and automatic retroactivity became the rule for criminal cases on direct 
review, while Chevron was relegated to the civil arena. 135 
As late as 1987, Chevron was employed to prevent retroactive appli -
cation of a decision altering the statute of limitations, in Saint Francis 
College v. Al-Khazraji. 136 By 1991, the tide of retroactivity, however, was 
rising. In Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson,137 the 
Court retroactive ly applied its adoption of a federal statute of limitations 
for suits under Rule I Ob-5 138 of the Securities Exchange Act 139 with no 
mention of either Chevron or non-retroactivity. Justices Stevens and 
Souter, dissenting, crit ic ized the majority for "undertak[ing] a lawmak in g 
task that should properly be performed by Congress" 140 and noted the diffi-
131. Jd at 106 (citations omi tted ) 
132. See id at 106-07. 
133. See id at I 08 (citation omitted). 
134. Linkl etter v. Walker. 38 1 US618,627( 1965). 
135. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 3 14, 322 n.8 ( 1987) . 
136. 481 U.S 604 (1987) . The Saini Francis plaintiff had filed his suit in 1980, and Third Circuit 
cases starting in 1977 had held that a six-year statute of limitations (rather than the two-year 
limitations period the Third Circuit announced in 1985) governed his claim. Interestingl y, one month 
later the Court decided the appeal of the law-changing circuit court decision. The original complaint 
in that case, Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co, 482 US. 656 ( 1987), had been tiled in 1973 . Reason ing 
that the law in 1973 was unsettl ed and the plaintiff cou ld not have relied on circuit precedent 
establishing the six-year limitat ions period. the Court held th at the new rule specifying the two-year 
statute of limitations shoul d apply. This created a sort of hopscotch retroactivity: The new rul e was 
applied to the 1973 act ion, but the old one was applied to the 1980 action. 
137. 501 us 350 (199 1 ). 
138. 17 C.F.R. § 240. 1 Ob-5 ( 1998). 
!39. 15 US.C.~78j(b)( l 994) 
140. Lampj, 50 1 U.S at 366 (Stevens. J .• dissenting). 
~I 
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cult questions of retroactivity created by judicial decisions based on policy 
determinations. 141 Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, invoking Chevron and 
Saint Francis, criticized the majority's silent disposition of the retroactiv-
ity question for both its disposition and its silence. 142 
One plausible explanation for those features of the majority opinion, 
as mentioned in Part I, is the positive source of the law being applied. 
Lampf involved an interpretation of Section 1 Ob-5, an unchanging 
statute; 143 one might plausibly think that since the statute had not changed, 
the law had not either, and the Court's decision therefore raised no retro-
activity issues at all. This understanding of statutory interpretation would 
avoid the pitfalls of the transaction-time model, by avoiding the question 
of retroactivity entirely. But while positive source does affect the plausi-
bility of characterizing overruling decisions as "changing the law," the 
Court has never distinguished between statutory and constitutional adjudi-
cation,144 and its statute of limitation retroactivity decisions do work within 
the transaction-time model. 
Lampf is thus probably better understood as simply evidence of the 
growmg influence of Griffith. There is, after all, no obvious reason to 
141 See id at 367-68. 
142. Like Saint Francis and Goodman. Lampfand its consequences have a story worth telling. Six 
months after Lampf, Congress added Section 27 A to the Securities Exchange Act. Section 27 A(a) 
overruled Lampffor cases pending when it was handed down; with respect to cases still in court. this 
was clearly constitutionally acceptable. Section 27 A(b) went further, attempting to reinstate those of 
the cases that had been dismissed as time-barred as a result of the Lampf decision. This latter section 
spawned a cottage industry of commentary and bad puns. See. e.g, Patrick T. Murphy. Note, Section 
27A of the SEA: An Unplugged Lampf Sheds No Constitutional Light, 78 MINN. L REV. 197, 211-12 
(1993); Craig W. Palm, The Constitutionality of Section 27A of the Securities Exchange Act.· Is 
Congress Rubbing Lampf the Wrong Way?, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1213. 1213 (1992); Anthony Michael 
Sabino, A S!atutory Beacon or a Relighted LampP The Constitutional Crisis of the New Limitary 
Period for Federal Securities Law Actions, 28 TULSA LJ. 23 , 61-64 (1 992). In Plaut v. Spendthrift 
Farm. Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 240 (1995). the Court struck down Section 27A(b) as an unconstitutional 
infringement on the separation of powers, fulfilling in part Justice Kennedy's prediction. See Lampf, 
50 I U.S at 379 (Kennedy, J, dissenting) (stating that even congressional action would "not avail 
defrauded investors caught by the Court's new and unforgiving rule"). The result of the Lampf-27 A-
Plaut three-step was thus that litigants who, though time-barred under Lamp[, had managed to hang 
on until the passage of27A had the sword lifted. But even that was not the end. Section 27A said 
nothing about untiled cases, and in a final twist, investors defrauded before Lampf but who had not 
filed suit at the time Lampf was decided had their claims subjected to the new. shorter limitations 
period. 
143. SeeLampf,SOI USat352. 
144. Nor does positive source work very well as a policy justification: the reliance interests of 
parties who put their trust in judicial opinions cannot be meaningfully distinguished based on whether 
those opinions interpret statutes or the Constitution. This sort of metaphysical answer to a practical 
problem is characteristic of some retroactivity scholarship, see infra notes 171-81 and accompanving 
text, but its arid l~Jrmalism is quite unappealing. 1\s Part lll argues infra, there is a better way . 
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distinguish between civil and criminal suits, 145 and the tension between 
Chevron and Griffith was bound at some point to erupt into openly ac-
knowledged conflict. Lampf clearly suggested that Chevron was in diffi-
culty, and the tide of retroactivity overtopped the barrier between criminal 
and civil cases in the succession of tax refund suits decided between 1989 
and 1993. 
3. Tax Refunds 
It is a well-settled principle of law that a state must provide retrospec-
tive relief from an unlawful tax if it does not provide the taxpayers with a 
meaningful opportunity for prepayment challenge.146 This relief need not 
take the form of a refund; if, for example, a tax violates the Equal Protec-
tion C lause, the state may remedy the violation by imposing additional 
taxes retrospectively to equalize the discriminatory treatment. 147 
Cases in which a tax is clearly unconstitutional when enacted thus 
present no real issue of retroactivity: Purely prospective relief for coerced 
payments is inadequate as a matter of due process .148 The difficult ques-
tion from the retroactivity perspective is what result obtains when a tax 
was not clearly unconstitutional when enacted but became so as a result of 
subsequent Supreme Court decisions. 
American Trucking Ass 'ns v. Smith 149 confronted, but did not resolve, 
this question . The Smith plaintiffs challenged an Arkansas trucking tax as 
a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. 150 While the case was 
pending, the Court decided American Trucking Ass 'ns v. Scheiner,151 
which held unconstitutional a similar Pennsylvania tax. 152 In Smith, Justice 
145. But see American Trucking Ass ' ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 197-99 (1990) (sett ing forth 
j ustifications for disparate treatment of criminal and civil cases). Justice O'Connor's attempt to 
reconstruc the hi sto ry of retroactivity doctrine is valiant but ultimately unpersuasive. Linkletter 
clearly did not see the ditTcrences she posits; it does not draw the distinction and in fact denies it. See 
Linkletter v Walker, 381 US. 6 18, 627 ( 1965). More seriously, Justice O'Connor's proposed 
distincti on encounters serious difficulties when the same law is implicated in both civil and criminal 
conte xts. Fallon and Meltzer offer the following exampl e: if a state brings both civ il and cri minal 
non payment actions against a delinquent taxpayer, and the tax is held unconstitutional by a decision 
rendered v;hile the cases are on appeal , different results in the criminal and civi l sp heres will imply 
that the tax was both constitutional and unconstitutional at the time of the nonpayment. See Fallon & 
Meltzer, supra note 42, at 1767-68. Thi s makes law rather too much like quantum physics: a tax 
statute is no Schroedinger' s cat. 
i 46. See, e.g, McKesson Corp . v. Di vision of Alcoholi c Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 22 
(1990) : Ward v. Love County, 25 3 U.S 17,24 (1920). 
! 47. See Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U S 749, 755 ( 1995). 
148 . See Harper v. Virginia Dep 't ofTaxatio n, 509 U S. 86, I 0 I ( 1993) 
149. 496 US. 167 (1990). 
150. See id. 
151. 483 U.S. 266 ( 1987) 
!52. See id at 269. 
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O'Connor, writing for a plurality of four, m employed the Chevron three-
factor analysis and concluded that Scheiner should not be applied to taxes 
for highway use prior to the date of that decision. 154 
Like the Stovall regime, the Smith approach drew support from very 
different camps. While the plurality favored selective prospectivity and 
sought to contain Griffith within the criminal sphere, Justice Scalia, who 
provided the fifth vote for the non-retroactive resu lt in Smith, did so be-
cause he believed that the holding of unconstitutionality was incorrect. 155 
This position bears an obvious similarity to Justice Harlan's early prag-
matic tendency to accede in selective prospectivity out of a desire to limit 
the effect of reforms he found unwise. Scalia's theoretical justification, 
however, was a neo-Blackstonianism that most closely resembles the po-
sition of the Gelpcke Court. Conceding the authority of the Scheiner 
opinion as a matter of stare decisis, he denied its correctness and refused 
to be bound on pre-Scheiner questions. 156 The principle underlying this 
position, the same as that driving the opinion in Gelpcke, is that while an 
incorrect decision may compel a judge to acquiesce in a subsequent case , 
it does not change the true (prior) law. 157 For Justice Scalia, the result in 
Smith turned on authority, not retroactivity; the question was to what ex-
tent he was bound to adhere to a deci sion with which he disagreed. 158 
On the question of retroactivity, Justice Scalia, like the four 
dissenters, 159 emphatically denied the propriety of. prospective decision-
making. Thus while Justice O'Connor mustered five votes in favor of a 
se lectively prospective result, the theoretical alignment was a five to four 
split against prospectivity entirely. Where the plurality sought to cabin 
153. The plurality was composed of Justices O'Connor, White, and Kennedy and Chief Justice 
Rehnquist. 
154. See Smith, 496 US. at 178-83 . The Court 's tr<:atment of retroactivity as a federal question 
was inconsistent with Scheiner, which had remanded to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for a 
consideration of retroactivity. See Scheiner, 483 U.S at 297-98. The Pennsylvania court held that 
Scheiner should be applied purely prospecti ve ly, and the taxpaye rs received onl y a pro-rated refund 
fo r the year in which Scheiner was decirled. See American Trucking Ass 'ns v. McNulty, 596 A.2d 
784, 790 (Pa 1991 ). 
155. See Smith , 496 U.S. at 202-04 (Scalia. J.. concu rring). 
156. See id at 204-05 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
157 . Arguably, if Scheiner had claimed to app ly its new rul e retroactively , it would have 
constituted an authoritative statement of transacti on-time law, binding Justice Scalia to a similar result 
in Smith. The Scheiner Court, however, remanded for a consideration of retroact ivity , and the 
Pennsy lvania court held in favor of prospectivity . See supra note 154 . 
158. See Smith, 496 U.S. at 204-05 (Scalia, J , concurring). 
159. Compare American Trucking Ass 'ns v Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 201 (Scalia. J. , concurring) 
("[P]rospective dec isionmaking is incompatible with thejudicial role .... "), with id at 214 (Stevens. 
L di sse nting) (" [A]dherence to legal principle requires that we determine the ri ghts of liti gants in 
accordance with our best current understanding of the !aw.'' ). 
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Griffith, the dissent urged its expansion. 160 Given the clear supp01t of Jus-
tice Scalia, there was no doubt that a majority of the Court was willing to 
bring Griffith into the civil arena. 
When the Court decided its next tax refund retroactivity case in 1991, 
Justice Souter had replaced Justice Brennan. Any hopes this shift might 
have kindled in foes of Griffith were swiftly dashed. James B. Beam Dis-
tilling Co. v. Georgid 61 produced five opinions, none of which com-
manded more than three votes. Majority trends were evident, however. 
Six Justices rejected selective prospectivity, and three of those condemned 
any sort of prospectivity at all. 162 Two years later, Harper v. Virginia De-
partment of Taxation 163 found five Justices explicitly extending Griffith's 
mandate of equal treatment for similarly situated parties to civil cases, and 
selective prospectivity was finally interred. 164 
4. Summary 
Given the complexity of the retroactivity jurisprudence, it is worth 
pausing at this point to recapitulate at a slighter higher level of generality. 
I have divided the analysis by subject matter in order to display the prog-
ress of the Court ' s reasoning in similar cases; the result of unifying the 
picture may resemble the blind men's experience of the elephant . The 
disparate narrative threads combine to form a somewhat tangled tapestry, 
and the following summary may lack aesthetic uni ty. Life does not always 
imitate art. 
The basic outlines, however, should be relatively clear . 
retroactivity emerged in the criminal context with Linkletter v. 
160. See id at 214 (Stevens , 1.. dissenting). 
Non-
Walker 
161. 501 US. 529 (1991). Beam featured a fact pattern similar to Smith. A 1984 decision, 
Bacchus Imports. Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984), had struck down a Hawaii tax as violating 
the Commerce Clause. The Beam plaintiff so ught refunds for monies collected under a very similar 
Georgia tax . That the tax was unconsti tutional was clear: Georgia had repealed it in 1985 . See Beam, 
501 U.S. at 532. The question was whether relief was available for pre-1984 taxes , i.e. , whether 
Bacchus was retroactiv ely effective . See id. 
162. Justices Blackmun, Marshall , and Scalia railed against prospectivity . See Beam . 501 U.S. at 
547 (Biackmun, J .. concurring): id. at 548 (Scalia, J., co ncurring). Justi ce Souter. delivering the 
opinion of the Court desp ite being joined onl y by Justice Stevens, reje cted se lective prospectivity, and 
stated that "GrUfi th cannot be confined to the criminal law." ld. at 540. Justice White al so concurred , 
rejecting selective prospectivity but adding that he believed Griffith had been wrongly dec ided. See 
id. at 545 (White, J., concurring). 
163. 509 U.S. 86 (1993). 
164 . See id at 90. The continuing vitality of pure prospectivity is highly questionab le. Justice 
White, writing separate ly in Beam , criti cized Justice Souter's opinion for reserving the question and 
thereby suggesting doubts. See Beam, 501 U.S. at 546. Pure prospectivity does retain the support of 
at le ast three current Justi ces (O'Connor, Kennedy. and Rehnquist) . For reasons rel atin g to the 
limitations of their theoretical approach, however, it seems unlikely that pure prospectiv ity will 
resurface. See infra note 277 and accompanying text. 
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(1965). Stovall v. Denno ( 1967) provided for unified treatment of cases on 
direct review and those presented by habeas petitions and permitted selec-
tive prospectivity. Chevron Oil v. Huson (1971) extended prospectivity 
into the civil arena . Criminal law, meanwhile, was becoming increasingly 
inhospitable to selective prospectivity, and Griffith v. Kentucky ( 1987) 
rejected it. Teague v. Lane ( 1989), following Justice Harlan, announced 
restrictive standards for the availability of retroactive relief to habeas peti-
tioners. 
Griffith proved impossible to contain within the criminal sphere, and 
in Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation ( 1993 ), the Court embraced 
Griffith's mandate of equal treatment in civil cases as well: If a new rule is 
applied in the decision that announces it, it must be applied in subsequent 
cases on direct review. In consequence, retroactive results have reassumed 
the primacy they enjoyed before the Warren Court's innovations. (The 
most recent retroactivity decision, Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 
breaks new ground only in its treatment of the remedies; it is discussed in 
detail infra Part III.) 
The end of all the Court's explorings has been to arrive, more or less, 
where it started: "New" legal rules are applied to cases on direct review 
but not to those presented collaterally. 165 But while the current Court 
reaches much the same results as it would have before it embarked on its 
non-retroactivity odyssey, there is a significant theoretical difference . The 
concept of retroactivity has emerged , and the question of retroactivity 
stands now as one of the knotty problems of our jurisprudence. lt is not 
the Everest of legal theory, the central concern that the countermajoritarian 
difficulty was for Bickel's generation of scholars, but it is a difficult sub-
ject that has attracted the attention of a number of talented and ambitious 
legal thinkers. The next section considers the efforts of the academy to 
answer the question of retroactivity. 
165. Because the avail ability of collateral review used to be much narrower, the pre-Link/etter 
treatment of coll ateral review is rarely displ ayed. Chico/ County Drainage Dis!. v. Bwaer State Bank, 
303 U.S. 37 ! ( 1940), is the most illuminating pre-Warren Supreme Court decision featuring a 
collateral attack arguing for the application of new law, and it rejects the argument because of the 
collateral nature of the challenge . See id. at 376-77 . Interestingly, courts and commentators se<.:m to 
think that the hi storical approach would have been to decide collateral attacks based on new law-th is 
fear w a> , after all, what necessit ated Linkleller 's "strong reading" of its precedents See. e.g , 
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 61 8, 628-29 n. l3 ( 1965) (listing Warren Court cases ap pl ying new law 
to collateral attacks); Dani el J. Meador, Habeas Corp us and the "Retroactivity " Illusion, 50 V A. L. 
REv. 1115, 111 6-20 (1964 ) (arguing for application of new Jaw to habeas petitions) . Thus, the irony 
of the Warren Court 's retroacti vity jurisprudence is that , as Part Ill demonstrates, not onl y was the 
cure worse than the di sease, but there was no disease at all. Linkleller created the very problem it 
tri ed un successfull y to so lv e. 
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C. Modern Retroactivity Scholarship: The Question Answered? 
Academics show rare consensus in their estimation of the Court's per-
formance: it is unsatisfactory. James Haddad laments that "doctrinal con-
fusion and inconsistency are the hallmark of nonretroactivity jurispru-
dence."1 66 Jill E. Fisch comments that "the Supreme Court's recognition 
of the intellectual poverty of its retroactivity analysis has led to efforts to 
formulate a more rational analytical structure, albeit with limited 
success." 167 
The general dissatisfaction with the Court's retroactivity jurisprudence 
has not produced a corresponding consensus on the appropriate alternative. 
One scholar seems to think there is no problem; 168 others believe that the 
question of retroactivity is best understood as a question of remedies; 169 
still another suggests that retroactivity analysis should be guided by a 
model of equilibrium drawn from physics. 170 The following sections take 
up these attempts to answer the question . 
I. Metaphysical Answers to Practical Questions 
a. Ronald Dworkin 's Neo-Blackstonian Approach 
Ronald Dworkin ' s critique of positivism provides a clear statement of 
the principles underlying the transaction-time model : retroactive applica-
tion of the law is unjust, and consequently the morally relevant rights and 
duties are the ones existing (i.e., legally recognized) at the time of the 
transaction. 171 He faults positivism precisely because it suggests that judi-
cial decisions retroactively impose new duties, and his theory of adjudica-
tion is designed to do away with this unfairness. 172 Dworkin's positive 
theory maintains that legal decisions enforce pre-existing rights, and that 
right answers exist in almost all cases. 173 As a result, Dworkin sees judi-
cial decisions as best readings of settled law conjoined with principles of 
justice and endorses decision-time results as the correct statement of trans-
166. Haddad , supra note 64, at I 062 (citing Beytagh, supra note 84 , at 1558-96; John Bernard 
Corr, Retroactivity.· A Study in Supreme Court Doctrine "As Applied, " 6 1 N.C. L. REv. 745, 748-63 
(1983)) 
167. Fisch, supra note I, at I 058. 
168. See infra Part li.C.I 
169. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 42 , at !733. 
170. See Fisch , supra note I, at I 056. 
17!. See DwORKIN, supra note 23, at 81-85. 
172. See id at 8!-85 , 335; R. Lea Brilmayer, The Institutional and Empirical Basis of the Rights 
Thesis, 11 GA. L. R EV. !173 , !!75-76 ( !977); Kenneth J. Kress , Legal Reasoning and Coherence 
Theories: Dworkin 's Rights Thesis. Retroactivity, and the Linear Order of Decisions, 72 CAL. L. REv. 
369, 373-74 (!984) 
! 73. See DwORKI N, supra note 23 , at 87, 279-80; see also RONALD DWORKIN. A MATTER OF 
PRINCIPLE !19-45 ( !985); Kress , supra note 172. at 3 74 . 
• 
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action-time rights. 
This unification of decision- and transaction-time law seems to do 
away with the problem of retroactivity, just as the Blackston ian model did. 
If a judicial decision is simply the best reading of the law, then it produces 
not only the just but the legally correct answer, and there is no issue of 
retroactively imposing new duties on parties before the court. 
A first criticism of Dworkin ' s account is that metaphysical solutions 
do not resolve practical problems. The key issue of retroactivity is one of 
unfairness, not injustice . That is, the problem in applying decision-time 
law is not so much that the morally relevant rights and duties are transac-
tion-time, but that it is unfair to parties to judge them by law about which 
they had no way of knowing. Dworkin's argument that an overruling de-
cision is simply the best reading of pre-existing law may solve the meta-
physical problem, but it is cold comfort for parties who relied on clear 
precedent. 174 
A second criticism is that just rules and just results may not always 
coincide; the reasons that make a new legal rule right may not make that 
rule's result right in the case before the court. The Warren Court's analy-
sis of the purpose of the exclusionary rule, and its conclusion that retroac-
tive application would not further the principles of justice animating the 
rule's expansion, provide an example of such a case. For another instance 
of rule/result mismatch , consider a situation in which lower courts have 
regularly borrowed state statutes of limitation to govern an implied federal 
right of action. When the question is argued before the Supreme Court, 
the Court decides that a uniform federal statute of limitations will better 
serve justice by promoting uniformity and predictability.175 This reasoning 
is quite convincing; what is harder to see is how uniformity and predict-
ability are served by applying the new federal statute of limitations to 
cases pending on direct review. Thus the answer that seems right as a 
matter of theory may still work obvious injustice to the parties before the 
court. 
Both the preceding criticisms are external. They accept Dworkin' s 
claim s about how his model works and then take issue with the results. 
Both criticisms, further, are contestable. It is possible to argue that vindi-
cating pre-existing rights and duties is morally paramount regardless of 
whether parties can know what those duties are, and it is possible to argue 
that a Dworkinian judge will never reach a rule that, if applied, fails to 
174 . See Stephen R. Munzer, Right Answers. Preexisting Rights. and Fairness, 11 GA. L. REV . 
105 5. 106 1-62 ( 1977). But see D WORK iN, supra note 23. at 335-36 (rebutting Munzer, not ing that 
fairness enters into decisional calculus). 
175 . See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind , Prupi s & Petigrow v. Gilbertso n, 501 U.S. 350, 36 1-62 (1 99 1). 
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produce justice in the case before him . 
There exists a third criticism, however, which is internal to Dworkin ' s 
theory and more obviously devastating in its effect. It has been developed 
at length by Kenneth Kress, 176 and I recapitulate the argument only briefly. 
What Kress 's argument shows is that even within Dworkin ' s theory, judi-
cial decisionmaking can produce results that differ between transaction 
and decision time. Dworkin's analysis fails to take into account the extent 
to which intervening decisions, by changing the settled law, can alter the 
calculus that judges perform. 
The point is as follows. Dworkin advocates a sort of coherentist 
analysis, asking which result shows the body of preexisting law in its best 
light. 177 That analysis reveals the rights the parties held at the time of their 
actions, and it is those rights the court must vindicate. This would be well 
and good if litigation were instantaneous. But it is not; between a transac-
tion and its judicial resolution, many other judicial decisions may inter-
vene. These change the preexisting law, but they cannot be ignored-they 
are, after all, right answers. Since the body of preexisting law changes 
with intervening decisions, it seems clear that an intervening decision-
even one not directly on point 178--can change the result in a pending 
case. 179 In short, "legal rights depend upon the temporal order in which 
cases are decided." 180 Thus decision-time and transaction-time law are not 
necessarily the same on Dworkin ' s model: Depending on which cases are 
decided between the transaction and its legal resolution, the "correct" 
result may vary . And thus the Dworkinian approach does not provide even 
a metaphysical solution. 18 1 
b. The Answer from Positive Source 
What I have said about the influence of pos itive source on our intui-
tive understandings of retroactivity might suggest that a happy resolution 
176. See Kress, supra note 172, at 369. 
177. See RONALD DWORKIN , LAW'S EMPIRE 225-75 ( 1986). 
178. Dworkin has lesser problems with intervening dec isions that are directly on point , since their 
results, as best readi ngs, are presumably also correct for later cases. 
179. This must be the case unless all possible legal decisions can be derived from the body of 
settl ed law existing at any parti cular time. Dworkin does not urge this hyperformali st proposition, 
and with good reason: since reliance interes ts count in his calculus of justice, the existence of a legal 
rule as part of the settled law will have effects quite different from those of its existence in some 
metaphys ical heaven of "right answers" 
180. Kress, supra note I 72, at 3 72. 
18 1. The works of Dworkin that l cite are not centra ll y concerned with retroacti vi ty, and it may 
seem a bit unfair to take him to ta'k for problems with his answer to a qu es ti on he does not ask. But 
the prob lems are not tangenti al: they unrave l his accou nt of adjudicative leg itimacy. Furthermore, 
insofar as it is the retroacti ve element o f positivist adjudication with whi ch Dworkin find s fault, 
retroacti vity is a prime concern of his jurisp rudential theory . 
• 
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would be to determine retroactive effect by reference to the positive source 
of the changed law. Thus new statutory interpretations would be given 
retroactive effect in all cases, and new common law rules in none. Con-
stitutional decisions, of course, would be harder, but perhaps they could be 
identified as either best readings of existing precedent or discretionary 
changes of the law, and given retroactive effect in the former but not the 
latter case. This is, I think, the soundest metaphysical approach; that it 
does not appear to have been suggested by any scholar is perhaps a testa-
ment to the academy's sound pragmatic instincts .182 
A moment's reflection should show that this is no solution at all. 
First, the statutory/common law distinction bears no relation to any of the 
factors that are appropriately weighed in a retroactivity balancing test such 
as Linkletter's purpose-reliance-effect triad. (This is not to say that such 
balancing tests are a good solution, only that distinctions unrelated to the 
standard concerns of fairness and efficiencyl 83 are worse .) Second, the 
solution with respect to constitutional Jaw is unworkable . The distinction 
between "best readings" and discretionary "judicial legislation" turns in 
part on questions of legal philosophy such as whether principles are part of 
the law; as a result, di sagreement will present itself at a level of philo-
sophical generality not conducive to the creation of stable, consistent doc-
trine.1 84 This clash of jurisprudential philosophies is precisely the evil to 
be avoided. If some judicial deci sions appear unpleasantly legislative, that 
is a problem of judicial philosophy, not of retroactivity,185 and the question 
of what lavv to apply cannot be reso lved at the philosophical level. 
2. Remedial Analysis: Fallon and Meltzer 
Professors Fallon and Meltzer have recently suggested that retroactiv-
ity issues are best analyzed within the law of remedies. 186 The conclusion 
of this Article will be that remedial analysis is the only acceptable route to 
prospective results, and in this respect Fallon and Meltzer are clearly cor-
rect. Moreover, their general impulse-to dispense with high theory in 
favor of practical analysis-is refreshing and welcome. Yet the move to 
182. Indeed. Fallon and Me ltzer specificall y (and correctly) characterize the jurisprudential debate 
over whether new law is made or found as a waste of time. See Fallon & l'vle ltzer. supra note 42, at 
1764. 
183. Fisch identifies these as the leading prudential factors, see Fisch , supra note 1, at 1084-91, 
which seems correct, although she also seems to conflate utilitar ian ism with fairness. See id at 1085-
86. 
! 84 . See Fall on & Meltzer, supra note 42, at 1762 . 
185 . See Shea v. Loui siana, 470 U S 51 , 62 ( 1985) (White, J., dissenting) ("[C]oncems about the 
supposed usurpation of legislative authority by this Court genera ll y go more to the substance of the 
Co urt' s decisions than to whether or not they are retroactive .") . 
186. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 42 , at 1743. 
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pragmatism occurs a bit too early. Fallon and Meltzer do not investigate 
the theoretical commitments ofthe Court's model, but an understanding of 
these commitments is essential to understanding the ways in which the 
model has warped the doctrine. An analysis that proceeds solely on the 
basis of predictability sets difficult line-drawing tasks; litigation occurs 
precisely because legal results are unpredictable, and when unpredictabil-
ity rises to a sufficient level to warrant remedial adjustment is a question 
with no obvious solution. More seriously, by turning to a remedial analy-
sis that is not based on any theoretical account of retroactivity, Fallon and 
Meltzer succumb to some of the perennial lures of retroactivity analysis 
and end up repeating some ofthe Court's gravest missteps. 
For instance, Fallon and Meltzer endorse Stovall's selective prospec-
tivity on direct review. 187 Formalism may be a vice, but incoherence is no 
virtue, and incoherence is what selective prospectivity brings. The idea 
that getting to the Court first is a legally significant distinction-even in a 
remedial calculus-between otherwise identical cases is terribly hard to 
justify. Similarly, distinguishing between direct and collateral review re-
quires more than an appeal to the value of finality and the danger of dis-
ruption. These concerns are always presented by collateral attacks and 
ordinarily do not overcome a constitutional violation in the conduct of a 
trial. Absent some relevant theoretical difference between new law and 
old law-which the transaction-time model obliterates and remedial 
analysis does not replace- finality does not distinguish between habeas 
petitions relying on new law and ones urging violations of old law. Nor 
does it satisfactorily distinguish between habeas petitions and cases on 
direct review, since the states' interests in avoiding disruption and the de-
fendants' interests in application of the new rule are quite similar in both 
types of cases. 188 
Finally, by viewing appellate review through the lens of remedies, 
Fallon and Meltzer neglect the significant fact that courts do not merely 
award or withhold remedies ; they decide cases and articulate the law. 
True, what an appellant seeks is a reversal , and the reversal may be char-
acterized as a remedy for a past violation-though once we leave the area 
of constitutional criminal procedure, this description becomes significantly 
less attractive-but the appellant will also get a statement of what the law 
187. Seeidatl807. 
188. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 US. 314, 332 n.l (1 986 ) (White, J. dissenting) (arguin g th at 
fmality fails to di stinguish between cases on direct and co ll ateral review) . White ' s argument th at the 
burdens on the states are identical is overstated: although some habeas petitions wi ll feature tri als 
occurring later than some cases on direct revie w, habeas petitions as a class are likel y to feature older 
trials, for which witnesses and ev idence are more difficult to reassembl e. That finality is not the 
distinguishing feature, howeve r, seems quite true . 
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is, and ascertaining what the law is requires more than a remedial analysi s. 
Remedial considerations have a large, and perhaps a dominant, role to 
play in a sound retroactivity doctrine. Remedial analysis, however, must 
be grounded in a determination of what law applies. Attempts to answer 
the question of retroactivity by avoiding the theoretical inquiry build on 
shaky foundations indeed. 
3. Equilibrium Analysis: Jill E. Fisch 
In the most recent major scholarly contribution to the literature on 
retroactivity, Jill Fisch suggests that retroactivity analysis should proceed 
by reference to a model of legal change that analogizes legal regimes to 
physical equilibria. Where the existing legal regime is in a stable equilib-
rium, change should be non-retroactive; where it is unstable, change 
should be retroactive. 189 
Fisch's article is a work of great sophistication, and its analysis and 
critique of the existing retroactivity jurisprudence display deep insight. As 
an answer to the question of retroactivity, her equilibrium theory certainly 
uses the right factors- notice, reliance, efficiency, etc.-and arrays them 
in an interesting way. 190 But like Fallon and Meltzer, she does not imbed 
her analysis of legal change in an account of how it is that courts change 
the law-what exactly goes on when a decision is "applied retroactively" 
(or not) . Consequently, the mechanisms for implementing Fisch's desired 
reforms, and also some of their effects, are not investigated . The injunc-
tion to avoid retroactivity in disruptions of stable equilibria presumably 
requires pure prospectivity-a decision that does not apply the new rule 
even to the litigants in the law-changing case. Whether this is permissible 
for Article III courts-and I will argue that on the transaction-time model 
it is not-is left largely unexamined. 191 There are difficulties Fisch does 
not grapple with; her proposals work within the transaction-time model 
and hence cannot escape its problems. The following part examines those 
problems in detail and offers an alternative way of thinking about retroac-
189. See Fisch, supra note 1, at 1100-01. A stable equilibrium is one that returns to the same state 
after a di sturbance; an un stable equilibrium will instead end in a different equilibrium state if 
disturbed. Fi sch uses the example of a co in . in stable equilibrium on either face, in unstable 
eq uilibrium on edge . In the legal context, the stabl e/unstab le distinct ion appears roughly to 
correspond to the distin ction between sett led and unsettled law . 
190. The metaphor of equilibrium, however, is of limited utility, since it is just as hard to apply as 
the concepts it is to repl ace. The superiority of equilibrium analysis to one th at works in terms of 
settled or unsettled law is not obv ious . Simil arly, Fisch suggests that non-retroactivity is appropri ate 
fo r changes to stable equilibria, but adm its that retroactivity may be appropriate for smal l changes. 
See id at 1105-07. This is not much more helpful than a '"clear break" analysis, except that it gives a 
rather sharper statement of the proposition that there can be no clear break with unsettled law. 
191. Fi sch does undertake a brief inquiry into constitutional limits on non-retroactivity. She finds 
few and does not speciticall y address the advisory opinion iss ue . See id at 1073-84 . 
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tivity questions. 
III. THE PROBLEM OF RETROACTIVITY 
The question of retroactivity has proved exceedingly difficult to an-
swer. While the scholarship discussed in the preceding section has offered 
clever approaches and useful suggestions, it is not fully satisfactory be-
cause it dqes not grapple with the underlying conceptual difficulty. This 
underlying difficulty is not simply the question of what types of legal 
change exist; Jill Fisch's analysis of different kinds of equilibrium and 
transitions from one state to another is a more than adequate taxonomy. 
The key conceptual issue is rather how legal change is effected: what goes 
on when a court changes the law. Analysis of this issue is essential be-
cause policy prescriptions that are not based on an understanding of how 
courts change the law risk either incoherence, like Fallon and Meltzer's 
advocacy of selective prospectivity, or unconstitutionality, like Fisch's 
suggestion of pure prospectivity. The problem of retroactivity lies in the 
conceptual structure that baffles these policy prescriptions. That structure 
is the analytical framework I have been calling the transaction-time model. 
As long as the Court continues to decide retroactivity questions within this 
model, satisfactory answers are impossible; if the model is abandoned, the 
questions are not answered so much as dissolved. 
A. The Structure of Retroactivity Analysis: The Problem Discovered 
The problem of retroactivity, as preceding sections have claimed, is 
rooted in the Court's adherence to the transaction-time model. The task of 
this section is to show how the model gives rise to the intractable difficul-
ties of retroactivity analysis, and to offer some suggestions as to why we 
have arrived at such a theoretical impasse. 
1. The Transaction-Time Model and Its Discontents 
Since the transaction-time model is the focus of this section , I will 
start by taking a moment to recapitulate and give a slightly more detailed 
exposition of its operation. Recall that the transaction-time model starts 
from the premise that parties should be judged by the law in effect at the 
time of their actions. If the decision-time result is to be reached, it must 
be because decision-time law is also transaction-time law, i.e., because the 
new law is effective retroactively. The transaction-time model thus offers 
two options to a court deciding whether to apply a new rule retroactively. 
The court may apply the rule retroactively, thus changing the law in effect 
at the time of the relevant transaction. It may also announce that the new 
rule is to have only prospective effect: it will apply only to cases filed after 
• 
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the date of the law-changing decision . 
What are the consequences of these dispositions? Retroactive appli-
cation of new law, as mentioned earlier, changes the law that was in effect 
at the time of the parties' actions. Lower court decisions applying the old 
law to transactions occurring after the law-changing decision 192 are ren-
dered incorrect and must be reversed on appeal. Final decisions dealing 
with transactions after the law-changing decision, likewise, are made in-
correct; the law they applied is wrong-and is made wrong even in the 
past. 193 
Prospective application obviously does not change the law in the past. 
Thus it does not inject error into concluded proceedings. A court that 
holds a new rule prospective does not require it to be applied to past trans-
actions; it does not apply it even to the transaction in the case before it. 
The new rule that it announces is not the law governing the parties' trans-
action ; it is the law that will be applied to transactions occurring after the 
law-changing decision . 
This conceptual framework creates two interconnected difficulties. 
First, prospective decisionmaking is unconstitutional. That prospective 
decisionrnaking is not appropriate for the judiciary has been suggested 
before; 194 the above analysis should show why. Jurisdiction is the power to 
say what the law is. Federal courts have jurisdiction only over cases and 
controversies; they may say what the law is only as an incident to resolv-
ing disputes between actual litigants. If this means anything, it means that 
federal courts may only say what the governing law is, the law that applies 
to the litigants before them. Prospective decisionmaking clearly goes be-
yond this function; as Justice Cardozo put it, a prospective decision is 
merely a "prophecy ... that transactions arising in the future will be gov-
erned by a different rule." 195 It is a paradigmatic advisory opinion. Of 
192. Of course, the relevant time should be the date of the transaction in the law-changing case , but 
Linkletter rejects this approach . See supra note 83 and accompanyin g text. 
193 . This possibility creates two distin ct senses of the phrase "wrong when dec ided,. From the 
perspective of the court deciding thi s intermedi ate case, its decision is correct as a matter of the settl ed 
law at the time of the dec ision-not "wrong when decided ." But from the later perspective of the 
Supreme Court, having held the law-changing decision retroacti ve, the intermediate case is wrong as a 
matter of the law at the time it was decided, since the holdin g of retroacti vity changes the law in the 
pas t. 
The two senses are not always di st in gui shed, and do not need to be except where retroactivity is 
at issue. l will be using the latter, the criteri on of correctness from the perspective of the later Court. 
A simpl e way to understand thi s sense is to suppose that decisions are pegged to the body of law 
exi sting when they were rendered. Acco rding to the transaction-time model , changes in law that hav e 
retroactive effect make pegged earli er dec isions wrong. From the perspective of later courts, they are 
wrong when decided and should be reversed if possible. 
194. See, eg, James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 50 1 U.S . 529, 548-49 ( 1991) (S cali a, J , 
concurring). 
195. Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S . 358,366 (1932). 
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course it is also something more than that, since it creates the rule it pre-
dicts will apply . This transparent lawmaking function has been one of the 
bases for criticism of prospective decisionmaking, but its advisory char-
acter is a sufficient flaw from the perspective of Article III. On the trans-
action-time model, federal courts cannot engage in prospective decision-
making. 
This fact was recognized by the Stovall Court, though in slightly dif-
ferent tenns; 196 it was the looming threat of advisory opinions that drove 
the Court to rule that law-changing decisions must be applied to the pariies 
to that case. On the current Court, even the Justices most enamored with 
prospectivity have conceded that new rules must be applied in the case that 
announces them. 197 
Once that is done, however, the full rigidity of the transaction-time 
model becomes apparent. Applying the new law to the parties in the law-
changing decision changes the law as of the date ofthat transaction. Cases 
coming up on direct review that feature later transactions must be treated 
similarly; there is simply no way to distinguish them. 198 
Worse follows. The single retroactive application has also changed 
the law applicable to cases already finally decided. If the decisions may 
be collaterally attacked, there is error for which to attack them. Without a 
distinction between old law and new law-and this distinction is precisely 
what the transaction-time model eliminates-there is no way to avoid 
judging collateral attacks according to the new law, for the holding of ret-
roactivity has made it the old law. The obvious incoherence of the posi-
tion that law differs according to the procedural posture of a case may 
have been one of the factors driving the Stovall Court to abandon the dis-
tinction between direct and collateral review. Yet selective prospectivity 
does not resolve the underlying difficulty, since applying the new rule 
retroactively in even one case has the effect of changing transaction-time 
law. 199 The transaction-time model simply cannot accommodate a distinc-
tion between direct and collateral review. The Court has been reluctant to 
i 96. Stovall characterized the danger as the prospect that constitutional adjudications mighr '·stand 
as meie dictum" but noted that this concern was "rooted in the command of Article III ... that we 
reso lve iss ues solely in concrete cases or controversies. " Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293. 30 1 (1967). 
197. See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co, 482 U.S. 656, 689-90 ( 1987) (O 'Connor. J , concurrin g). 
Justice Kennedy is O'Connor's staunchest ally in the fight for prospectivity-a tight that as thi s 
section shows , is unwinnable within the transaction-time model. 
!98. Consequently, Justices looking to minimize the retroactive etlect of law-changing decisions 
would do well to shop for cases featuring recent tran sact ions. This itse lf seems somewh at inconsistent 
with the judicial role , but it is at least conceptually coherent. 
199. See Beam, 50 1 U.S. at 543 ("Once retroactive application is chosen for any assertedl y new 
rule , it is chosen for all others who might seek its prospective application. "). 
• 
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face this fact, preferring to rely on an untenable distinction, 200 but the 
problem cannot be denied. (Indeed, as the next section shows, the Court 
has had to struggle not to admit this consequence of the transaction-time 
model and has been only partly successful at keeping it out of the 
case law.) 
Teague is a solution , but not a happy one, and indeed it is symptomatic 
of a larger mistake . In analyzing the difficulties created by the interaction 
of retroactivity and collateral attack, both the Court and commentators 
have persistently seen habeas, rather than retroactivity, as the source of the 
problem .201 They have thus responded by tinkering with habeas-and this 
confusion has also infected the legislative process. An obvious way to 
prevent the feared avalanche of habeas petitions based on new law is to 
impose a time limit, or other restrictions, on habeas petitions. This has 
been done with the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996 ("AEDPA"). 202 
The AEDPA requires petitioners bringing a second or successive ha-
beas petition to obtain certification from a court of appeals that the petition 
contains newly discovered evidence establishing innocence, or a new rule 
of constitutional law the Su preme Court has "made retroactive to cases on 
collateral review."203 It al so imposes a one-year limitations period, which 
begins to run anew if the Supreme Court announces a new rule of consti-
tutional law and holds it applicable retroactively to cases on collateral re-
VIeW. 
The AEDPA is a c lear example of the shortcomings of try ing to fix a 
retroactivity problem by modifying habeas . When combined with the 
transaction-time modeL it reaches results that verge on unconstitutionality 
in some contexts. Specifically, by allowing new petitions to be based only 
on new constitutional rules, it denies relief to actually innocent prisoners . 
Here again, positive source is important, since it provides an intuitive 
augmentation of the meaning of retroactive application . ln statutory inter-
pretation, I have said, the impulse to adjudicative retroactivity is strongest. 
The law does not change, aithough interpretations do. When the Supreme 
200 . See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S . 288 (1989). Finality is the interest usual ly invoked to 
distinguish between direct and coll ateral review. The princip le of fin ality does draw a line. but not 
the one desired, for finality gives us no reason to distinguish between co ll ateral attacks based on new 
law and those based on old law. See Griffi th v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314,332 n.l (1987) (White, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that finality fail s to dis tin gu ish between cases on direct and collateral review) 
201. See. eg , Williams v. United States , 401 US. 667 , 701-02 (1971) (Harlan, J. , concurring): 
Haddad, supra note 64, at I 076-78 ; Meador, supra note 165. Haddad, ironically. critic izes the Co urt 
fo r changin g retroactivity doctrine in order to reshape habeas sub rosa. Changing re troactivi ty 
doctrine to elim in ate the trouble with habeas is precisely what shou ld be done . 
202 . Pub. L. No. 104-132, 11 0 Stat. 1214 ( 1996) 
203 . 28 USC§ 2255 ( 1994 & Supp . II 1996) 
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Court overrules a lower court's interpretation of a statute, it is hard to ar-
gue that people convicted under the rejected interpretation are not entitled 
to the benefit of the new ruling-it is hard to argue that the lower court's 
interpretation was not simply wrong. Thus in statutory interpretation 
cases, the AEDPA seems to bar relief for people who are clearly entitled to 
it, who were convicted and sentenced for conduct that is not now and 
never was a cnme. 
This conundrum emerged with particular clarity in the wake of the 
Supreme Court's decision in Bailey v. United States204 Bailey interpreted 
18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which imposes a five-year sentence on anyone who 
"uses or carries" a firearm "during and in relation to any crime of violence 
or drug trafficking crime." Bailey read "uses" to contain a requirement of 
active employment; it was not enough for a Section 924( c) conviction that 
the weapon was available for use. 205 And it did so retroactively; it applied 
the decision to Bailey himself. The consequence is that people convicted 
for merely having a weapon available are clearly innocent. Yet because 
Bailey is a case involving statutory interpretation, not the required new 
rule of constitutional law, the AEDPA appears to prevent them from 
bringing a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the habeas counterpart for fed-
eral prisoners. 
Courts that have confronted this problem have reacted with fancy ju-
dicial footwork, typically finding that the inadequacy of Section 2255 re-
lief entitles federal prisoners to the unusual avenue of habeas. 206 Their 
creative responses only highlight the fact that the statute is malfunction-
ing, that attempting to solve retroactivity problems through habeas reform 
is a serious mistake. And the problem that Teague and the AEDPA ad-
dress is quite clearly a consequence of retroactivity, not of habeas. The 
scope of issues cognizable on habeas may be set as broadly as those cog-
nizable on appeal; petitions relying on changes in law will still pose no 
threat to the administration of justice if they are judged by the law in effect 
at the time of their trials. 207 How to do this consistently while applying 
new law to cases on direct review is the overwhelming question of retro-
activity jurisprudence, and I will answer it later. For now, the point is only 
that it cannot be done within the transaction-time model, and tinkering 
with habeas does not help. 
204. 516US.l37(1995) 
205. See id at 150. 
206. See, e.g., Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361 (2d Cir. 1997); In re Dorsainville. 119 F.3d 
245 (3d Cir. 1997). 
207. There are, of course, those who want to restrict habeas for other reasons. But the troubled 
interaction between habeas and retroactivity clearly starts with the Warren Court ' s changes in law. 
and clearly stems from the difficulties in distinguishing direct from collateral review 
-
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The embarrassment of selective prospectivity, and the Court's convo-
luted history of attempts to distinguish between direct and collateral re-
view, are both products of the theoretical framework it has chosen. If it 
causes such difficulties, one must wonder why the Court did choose it. 
The next section offers a poss ible explanation. 208 
2. Origins of the Transaction-Time Model 
The premise of the transaction-time model-that parties should be 
judged by the legal standards in effect at the time of their actions-has 
some obvious attractions . Basic concepts of notice and reliance suggest 
that it is unfair to judge parties according to law of which they could not 
have known. These concerns have substantial intuitive appeal and feature 
prominently in the case law. 209 
However, as subsequent sections will show, there are other ways to 
give normative weight to notice and reliance. Choice of the transaction-
time model may be motivated in the first instance not so much by a con-
cern for protecting expectations as by the "discretionary" conception of 
judicial lawmaking. This conception is one in which hard cases confront 
judges with substantial indeterminacy. With no right answer available, 
judges must effectively legislate new rules as a matter of discretion. 
On this understanding, law-changing decisions create new rights and 
duties. Applying new rules to parties who acted in good faith reliance on 
the law that governed at the time of their actions is simply unjustifiable. 210 
"Retroactive effect," meaning reaching the decision-time result, must be 
justified by retroactivity, meaning changing transaction-time law.2 11 The 
transaction-time model sees judicial lawmaking as akin to legislative,212 
208 . Since this explanation sees the adoption of the transaction-time model as the consequence of a 
mi sunderstanding, it is of course onl y tentative. It is certainly presumptuous and perhaps impossibl e 
to pinpoint exactly what was misunderstood. 
209 . See, e.g, Chevron Oil Co . v. Huson, 404 U.S 97, 106-07 (1971) (noting the possible 
inequitable results of applying law ret roactive ly). 
2 10. See. e.g. , DWORKIN, supra note 23, at 85 (agreeing that " it would be wrong to sacrifice the 
rights of an innocent man in the name of some new duty created afte r the event"). 
21 i . The justification afforded by retroactive alteration of transaction-time law is obviously purely 
metaphysical in nature . It offers co ld comfort to parties who relied on old law with the expectation 
that it would not be changed. The jurisprudential underpinnings of the transaction-time model, for 
those sensitive to this unfairness, thus lead naturally to a very limited use of retroactivity. The most 
limited use would be retroactive app li cati on only in the case announcing the new rule. That is 
se lect ive prospectivity. and it is indeed where the transaction-time model led the Warren Court , in 
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 ( 1967). 
2 i 2. Thus the current dominance of the transaction -time model may be a co ntingent consequence 
of the historical fact that modern retroactivity jurisprudence begins with the law-changing criminal 
procedure decisions of the Warren Court. whi ch are most eas il y understood as legislative-style 
changes in law. The disruptive consequences of retroactivel y imposing new req uirements on the 
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and applies to it the same presumption of non-retroactive effect. 213 
As an explanation of the Linkletter Court's reasoning, however, the 
assimilation of judicial to legislative lawmaking is too pat to be believed. 
It is ironic that the Warren Court, under heavy criticism for the sin of "ju-
dicial legislation," adopted an analytical framework that admits to pre-
cisely that; it may even be revelatory to legal psychoanalysts who believe 
in the telling judicial parapraxis. But a recognition that its new rules were 
not compelled by precedene 14 cannot have been the conscious motivation 
of the Linkletter Court; it had, after all, already applied Mapp to cases 
pending on direct review, and pure prospectivity would be the normal 
treatment for legislative-style change. 
The real explanation for Linkletter's turn to the transaction-time model 
is most likely that the Court, having dramatically reshaped constitutional 
criminal procedure, was looking for help in rejecting collateral attacks 
based on new law. What this required, since the Court had already applied 
Afapp to cases on direct review, was a way of distinguishing between di-
rect and collateral review. It is in the quest for this distinction that modern 
retroactivity jurisprudence is born. Linkletter invoked the transaction-time 
model , most likely, because it succumbed to the delusion that a distinction 
between direct and collateral review may be drawn only by an approach 
that commits itself to the general proposition that courts should apply the 
law in effect at the time of the relevant transaction. Such an approach 
does suggest that old law should govern old transactions, and it is to lend 
jurisprudential authority to this proposition that Linkletter sets up Black-
stone and knocks him down with Austin. But the approach does not dis-
tinguish between direct and collateral review, a fact that seems simply to 
have escaped the Linkletter Court. 
From this perspective, Linkletter appears equal parts comedy and trag-
edy. The truth is that the desired distinction can in fact be made only 
within the model of retroactivity analysis that the Linkletter Court aban-
doned, the model that had prevented the question of retroactivity from 
becoming a problem for the fifty years or so that intervened between the 
states, coupled with the imposs ibility of dampening these consequences via remedial analysis, led the 
Court to seek prospective results within the transacti on-time model. 
213 . The "presumption" th at I refer to is theoretical and imbedded in the model: Absent 
retroact ivi ty, transaction-time results are proper. This does not mean that the transaction-time model , 
as empl oyed by the Court, tends to produce those results; the possibility of retroactivity means that 
application of transact ion-time law can st ill produce decision-time results. Although the Warren 
Court often reached transaction-time results, subsequent Courts, working largely within the same 
model, have changed direction so drastically as to make decision-time results the norm. 
214. See Linkl etter v Walker 381 U.S . 618, 630 (1965) ("[T]he federai exclusionary rule was not 
·derived from the explicit requirements of the Fourth Amendment . The decision was a matter of 
judicial implication.'") (quoting Wolfv . Co lorado. 338 U.S. 25 , 28 (1949)). 
-
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death of the Blackstonian understanding and the Warren Court 's rework-
ing of retroactivity. This model, and the solutions it offers, are the subject 
ofthe next section. 
B. Eliminating Retroactivity: The Problem Solved 
The transaction-time model has dealt courts two difficulties: it makes 
pure prospectivity unconstitutional, and it creates real problems with col-
lateral review. The first is not so major; more importantly, it is unavoid-
able . A purely prospective decision is advisory no matter how one looks 
at it. The second is more serious; it is what drove retroactivity doctrine on 
its erratic course between Linkleiter and Teague, and it is still with us, as 
the troubling new issues created by the AEDPA show. The solution lies in 
understanding why the problem used to be a non-issue, why retroactivity 
was not a difficult question until Linkletter. 
1. The Dog That Didn't Bark and the Decision-Time Model 
Until the 1960s, the question of retroactivity was a dog that did not 
bark . Like that of its famous Holmes215 counterpart, its silence tells us 
something important. Admittedly, until the dramatic innovations of the 
Warren Court, the question did not have the same degree of importance. 
But the issue existed; it is clearly present in cases such as Carpenter v. 
Wabash Railway Co. 216 and Chico! County Drainage District v. Baxter 
State Bank. 217 What distinguishes the smooth analysis of those cases from 
the Warren Court's lugubrious flailings is that they did not employ the 
transaction-time model, nor even the concept of retroactivity . They s im-
ply followed the general rule that a court must decide the cases before it 
according to the best current understanding of the law. 218 
This principle is the keystone of the alternate conceptual approach to 
retroactivity analysis, what I call the "decision-time model." Where the 
transaction-time model supposes that the legally relevant rights and duties 
are those existing at the time of the parties ' actions, the decision-time 
model starts from the opposite premise. Courts should apply the ir current 
best understanding of the law to all cases before them, regard less of 
whether the best understanding at the time of the transaction would pro-
duce a different result. 
21 5. Sherlock. not Oliver Wendell Jr. See SIR ARTHUR CO!'-!AN DOYLE, TH E COM PLETE 0RIGIN.'\L 
ILLUSTRATED SH ERLOCK HOL MES (SILVER BLAZE) 11 7 ( 1976). 
216 . 309 U.S. 23 , 27 (1940) (explaining that if a law intervenes and changes the govern ing ru ic 
after the judgment and before appellate review, appellate court must obey new law). 
217. 308 U.S 371, 374-7 5 (1940) (refusing to upset ajudgment based on a subseque nt change in 
the law). 
2 18. See. e g, Chico!, 308 U. S at 377. 
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A Court confronted with a "retroactivity question" thus has no choice 
in what law to apply if it is using the decision-time model. Current law 
governs, and the authority of a law-changing decision cannot be denied. 
Like the transaction-time model, however, the decision-time model can 
usually reach either result in terms of who wins the case. 
Producing the transaction-time result requires some work and may not 
always be possible. In many cases, however, use of the law of remedies 
will permit it. Suppose that the law-changing decision adopts a different 
statute of limitations, and that the injured party brings his suit before the 
expiration of the statute of limitations prevailing at the time he files. The 
suit may be time-barred under the new statute of limitations, but timely 
under the old. A court troubled by the unfairness of denying relief to an 
injured party based on new law might nonetheless allow the suit to pro-
ceed by equitably tolling the new statute of limitations. 219 Despite apply-
ing decision-time law, the court can nonetheless reach the transaction-time 
result. Reaching the decision-time result is more straightforward. With-
out any discussion of retroactivity, the Court simply applies the current 
law. 220 
The significant advantage of the decision-time model emerges when it 
is realized that this approach has no effect on the earlier law. While the 
transaction-time model requires a court to alter transaction-time law in 
order to achieve retroactive effect, the decision-time model does not. Ear-
lier decisions, pegged to their contemporaneous law, are consequently 
correct, although they will not be followed. 
2. Why the Decision Time-Model? 
Like the transaction-time model, the decision-time model is linked to a 
particular conception of judicial decisionmaking, and a choice of the deci-
sion-time model may be motivated in part by a different understanding of 
the judicial role. The province of the judiciary is to say what the law is, 
not what it was; one can maintain a priori that it is the duty of judges to 
219. This approach was rejected in Lampf Pleva. Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, SO 1 
U.S. 350, 361 ( 1991 ), and seems never to have been adopted by a majority of the Court. At different 
times, however, a number of Justices have commented that the question of what law applies should be 
distinguished from the question of what remedy may be granted. See. e.g, Harper v. Virginia Dep't 
of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 131-34 ( 1993) (O'Connor, l, dissenting) (pointing out that applying the 
rule retroactively is a separate question from the remedy to be given): James B. Beam Distilling Co. v 
Georgia. 501 U.S. 529, 534-35 (1991) (distinguishing the issue of applying a law forward or 
backward from determining remedies): United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 US 286, 297 ( 1970) 
(Harlan. J., concurring) (noting that the flexibility in the law of remedies does not affect the fact that 
generally courts should apply the prevailing rule) 
220. For an example of this approach. see Lampf, 501 U.S at 361. 
.. 
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decide cases based on their best understanding of the law. 221 However, the 
decision-time model may draw its attractiveness largely from the "right 
answer" conception of judicial lawmaking. This conception, naturally 
enough, is diametrically opposed to the one motivating the transaction-
time model. On this understanding, judicial lawmaking, while it may 
change results, reaches the right answer to the particular legal question 
posed. 222 Applying decision-time law on the " right answer" conception is 
simply reaching the just result in the case at hand .223 Concerns of notice 
and reliance may have weight within this model,224 but they must be taken 
into account in a remedial calculus. 225 
The "right answer" and the "discretionary" theories are competing 
visions of judicial decisionmaking. They can be loosely linked, respec-
tively, to natural law and positivist theories. 226 If the content of "law" is 
extended to include broad moral and political principles, then it is obvi-
ously easier to maintain that judicial decisions reach the right answer; if 
221 See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667,68 1 (1971) (Harlan , J , concurring). 
222 . See Beam, 501 U.S at 549 (Scali a, J., concurring) (stating that judges make Jaw "as though 
they were ' finding it'-discerning what the Jaw is, rather than decreeing what it is today changed to" ); 
DWORKIN, supra note 23 , at 81-87 . Dworkin's views have evolved over the ye ars, and his more 
recent work seems to place less emphasis on the principle that adj udication simply enforces 
preexisting legal rights. See DWORKIN, supra note 177, at 225 ("So law as integrity rejects as 
unhelpful the ancient questi on whether judges find or invent law; we understand legal reasoning, it 
suggests, onl y by seeing the sense in which they do both and neither. "). 
223. See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 , 259 (1969) (Harlan , J , dissent ing) 
("[Nonretroactivity] would belie the truism that it is the ta~k of this Court, like that of any other, to do 
justice to each litigant on the merits of his own case. "). 
224 . See , e.g., United States v. The Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. ( 1 Cranch) 103, 110 ( 1801) (noting that 
the court sho uld consider the effect on parties when applying Jaw retroactively in certain cases). 
225. Greater focus on remedi al discretion would certainly benefi t retroact ivity jurisprudence, as 
Fallon and Meltzer and others have argued. See, e.g., Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 42; Note, 
Retroactivity and the Exclusionary Rule: A UnifYing Approach, 97 HARV. L. REV. 961 (1984) 
(analyzing the retroactivity of Fourth Amend ment decisions). Even on the transaction-time model, 
remedial adjustments are possib le foll owing a conclusion that deci sion-time law is to be applied 
retroactive ly. See, e.g .. Beam, 50 1 U.S. at 535 (app lying a law retroactively may affect the remedy 
given). Thi s route to the remed ial ca lcu lus is somewhat circuitous, but if there were any reasons for 
favoring the transaction-time model , it might have been des irabl e. 
226. In pa rti cul ar, my discuss ion of the decision-time model prominently features a noti on akin to 
Ronald Dworki n's ''right answer" thes is. See DWO RKI N, supra note 23, at 87, 279-80 ; see also 
DWORK IN. s upra note 177, at 266-71. The concept of legal in determinacy requiring judicial 
di scretion re lates similarly to H.L.A. Hart 's positivist theory. See lf.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF 
LAW 244-54 (2d ed. 1994) However, the con nections between th e legal phil osophies and the model s 
are weaker than they may seem at first glance. Dworkin's ideas appear on both sides; the transaction-
time model is produced by conjoining Dworkin 's "rights thesis," see DWORKIN, supra note 23. at 82-
90, with a pos iti vist/reali st account of law-changing decision s. (A not ent irely happy marriage, to be 
sure.) Dwo rkin himse lf argues for the enfo rce ment of transacti on-time Jaw as a matter of principle but 
seems to suppose that the correct dec ision-time answer is the same . Thi s neo-Bl ackstoni an approach, 
as discussed earlier, elides the ques ti on of what happens when law changes between transaction and 
decision. 
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"law" is more narrowly construed, it appears that judicial decisionmaking 
is more often discretionary. These linkages invite more exploration, but I 
hope to avo id the quagmire of jurisprudence. 227 My purpose is emphati-
cally not to argue for the adoption of one or the other model on the basis of 
its philosophical pedigree. 
Moreover, the success ive embrace of non-retroactivity by the Warren 
and Burger Courts shows that results, in the sense of retroactivity or non-
retroactivity, are not tied to political program s; nor, a fortiori , are models. 
Because polit ical valence changes over time, 228 a theoretical investigation 
of retroactiv ity should be able also to avoid the ideological thicket. My 
aspiration is merely to achieve a perspicuous rendering of the theoretical 
structure of retroactivity analysis and a prescription for enhanced clarity 
and coherence. The two models differ in their abilities to reach particular 
results; consequently, there are good reasons to se lect the one that allows 
our current regime to be presented as a body of doctrine formed by con-
sistent application of principles rather than one that is internally contra-
dictory and relies on unjustifiable distinctions. 
In particular, as mentioned above, the deci s ion-time model allows 
courts to apply a change in the law to cases pending on direct review with-
out creating error in concluded proceedings. The problem of collateral 
attack does not arise; the deci s ion-time model distingui shes between direct 
and collateral review. 
The mechanics of the distinction are fairl y straightforward. On direct 
rev iew, an appellate court re-examines contested issues according to the 
best current understanding of the law. Thus, affirman ce on direct rev iew 
call s for repetiti on: An affirmed deci s ion has the authority of the affirming 
court behind it. 
Collatera l review works differently. For a dec is ion to surv ive collat-
eral review, the reviewing court must asseri not that the result would be 
the same if the case were liti gated at the time of the co ll atera l attack, but 
merely that the decis ion was correct when rendered. Of course, this prin-
cipl e is seldom apparent in civil cases. Res j udicata ordinarily prevents 
reli t igation of claim s, and it will shie ld even a decision that was wrong 
227. The debate over whether law is "made" or "fo und,'' wh ich corresponds roughl y to my 
discretionary/ri ght an swer models of judicial lawmak ing, is interesting from a metaphys ical 
perspective but no t very use fu l. Ne ither account is es peciall y plausib le as a description of all , or even 
the essence of, judici al deci sions . Judging is a craft: its instan ces are rel ated not by derivati on from a 
platonic un iversal but by a fami ly resemblance. See POSNER, supra note 8, at 226. My prescriptive 
clai m is th at di sparate types of judicial lawmaking nonethe less require a unifie d retroactivity analys is, 
in order to produce stabl e and coherent doctrine. Thus, what is esse ntial is to select a parti cul ar 
anal yti cal framework rather than wandering in the me taphys ical desert. 
228 . See J.M. Balkin, !deolagical Drift and the Struggle Over ,'v!eaning, 25 CoNN . L. RE V. 869 
(1993). 
.. 
1999] THE MYTH OF ADJUDICATfVE RETROA CTIVITY 1121 
when rendered. Importantly, however, the principle does operate in cases 
where the issue is whether res judicata is available as a defense; it is this 
fact that allows us to discern the nature of collateral review. 229 
In criminal cases, where the writ of habeas corpus allows for broader 
collateral challenges, the nature of collateral review obviously assumes 
greater importance. The availability of habeas is not restricted by the or-
dinary rules of res judicata, and relitigation of issues is permitted .230 Ha-
beas is, nonetheless, a col lateral remedy, focusing on the correctness of the 
judgment when rendered . For example, repeal of a criminal law, which 
clearly bars future prosecutions and abates those for which appeal is 
pending, 231 does not provide grounds for a habeas petition .232 A change in 
law, on the decision-time model, has no effect on the soundness of an ear-
lier judgment; a decision-time result on direct review does not alter the 
law applicable to a habeas petitioner. 233 It is only the transaction-time 
229. As Justi ce Harlan pointed out in Mackey v. United States , 401 US 667. 698 (1971) (Harlan, 
1., concurring) , Chicot was such a case and employed precisely the analysis I advocate . Chico/ 
featured an attempt to attack co ll aterally a plan of debt readjustment iss ued by a district court 
pursuant to a statute later held unconstitutional. See Chicot County Drainage Di st. v. Baxter State 
Bank, 308 US 37 1.373-74 (1940). Res judicata prevents parties from relitigating issues that were or 
could have been raised in an earlier proceed ing, with an exception for void judgments. Lack of 
subject-matter jurisdi ctio n renders a judgment void, so if the statute providing jurisdiction is 
unconst itutional, res judicata cannot be raised as a defen se. The Chico/ Court allowed the res judicata 
defense based on the proposition that the statute granting jurisd ict ion to the di strict cou rt was 
constitutional at the time of the debt readjustment, havin g been so adjudged by that court . See id. at 
377-78. This treatment of collateral review is the direct analog to the argument thi s Article makes 
about the consequences of the decision-time model for habeas. Using the decision-time model, a 
court engaged in collateral review need concern itself only with the question of whether the 
challenged deci sion was righ t when rendered. A similar approach was followed in Cipriano v. City of 
Houma, 395 U.S 701, i06 ( 1969) (applying approach to Louisiana law giving right to vote only to 
" property tax payers") . 
230. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 118, at 1345. 
231. See, eg , United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217 , 223 (1 934) (holding that cases pending for 
violati ons of the National Prohibition Act cou!d not be conti nued when the Eighteenth Amendment 
was repealed). Legislatures may , of course , provide by savings clauses that pending prosecutions are 
to continue despite repeal. See, e g, 1 U S . C.~ 109 ( 1994) 
232. See, e.g, Welch v. Hudspeth. 132 F.2d 434 , 436 (I Oth Cir. 1942) (denying collateral relief to 
petitioner whose conviction became final before repeal of Prohibition). As I argue below, an 
exception exists for petiti oners whose conduct is held constitutionally protected after their convictions 
become final. The repeal of Prohibition does not, of course, qualify for this exception because the 
Twenty-first Amendment did not recogni ze a constitutional right to manufacture or se ll liquor. 
233 . The prevailing drift of scholarship on this point, interestingly, seems to run in directly the 
opposite direction, arguing that even non-retroactive application of law-changing decisions should 
allow habeas petitioners to benefi t. See, e.g., Meador, supra note 165. Meador starts from the 
premise that imprisonment is an ongoing sanction-which is clearly true- and contends that "the 
situation is as though the warden appeared at the prisoner 's ce ll every morning bearing the illegally 
se ized ev iden ce in hi s hands, thereby using it to keep the prisoner in confinement for another day ." 
ld. at 111 7. That thi s conclusion simpl y cannot be correct can be see n by imagini ng a change in 
Federal Rules of Crimin al Procedure-requiring, for example, yellow paper where before green was 
requir<:d . We cannot say, in adjudging a petition under 28 U.S C.~ 225 5 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). that 
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model, with its retroactive creation of error in earlier trials, that allows 
habeas petitioners the benefit of law-chang ing decisions . The decision-
time model thus itself makes the distinction between direct and collateral 
review that so plagued the Warren Court.234 
This distinction does not mean , of course, that a habeas petitioner can 
never win relief on the decision-time model. Habeas lies for pri soners 
held "in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United 
States." 235 Incarceration after a change in law might violate the Constitu-
tion in two primary ways-ways which, interestingly enough , precisely 
track the Harlan/Teague exceptions to non-retroactivity on collateral re-
VIew. 
First, a prisoner seeking the benefit of a new constitutional rule that 
placed "certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the 
power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe" should be able to 
argue that his continued imprisonment is unconstitutional. 236 The argu-
ment for this result relies on a distinction between privative sanctions such 
as fines, which can be remedied only retroactively, and ongoing sanctions 
such as incarceration, which can be remedied prospective ly. Continued 
punishment requires continuing power to proscribe. If certain conduct is 
held constitutionally protected, the government loses the ability to punish 
it, and continued sanctions are imposed only in violation of the Constitu-
tion .237 Thus collateral attack should be able to win prospective relief 
·' the warden shows up every day bearing the green paper; and now th at ye ll ow is required the prisoner 
must go free." Paper changes , of course, could be dealt with by harmless error analysi s, and a 
stronger po int against Meador's argument is the fact that even repeal o f the law under whi ch a 
crimi nal is imprisoned wil i not all ow coll ateral attack on the co nv icti on. 
234. Thi s is not to say th at it makes habeas s impl e. A court faced with a habeas pet iti on re lyi ng on 
new law must stii! decide if the law is actuall y new- whi ch may depend on its pos itive source or on 
more practical cons iderations. Shorn of the jurisprudential woo l th at clings to the ide a o f " new law," 
this is essentiall y the question of ret roactiv ity, and as such it is not the co ncern of the Artic le. F isch 's 
equilibrium analysis, or Fallon and Meltzer 's approach through remedi es, are good examples of 
attempts to deve lop rules fo r deciding that issue; it is work enough fo r thi s Arti cle to reach a pos ition 
in which the decisi on is poss ibl e. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 42 ; Fi sch, supra note I. 
235 . Judic iary Act o f 1867 , ch. 28, ~ I , 14 Stat. 385-86 ( 1867) . 
236. Such seems to be the dominant practi ce. In United States ex rei. Williams v. Preiser, 360 F. 
Supp . 667 (S. D.N. Y. 1973), a phys ic ian conv icted under a state abortion-manslaughter statute won 
re lease after the decis ion in Roe v. Wade , 41 0 U.S . 11 3 (1 973). See also Robin son v. Ne il , 409 U. S. 
505 , 510-11 ( 1973) (noting that Linkletter an alys is is inappli cabl e to non-procedural rights) 
237. See United States v. United States Coi n & Currency, 40 1 U.S. 7 15, 726-27 (1 97 1) (Brennan , 
1., concurring) (stating that "a dec ision holdi ng certain conduct beyond the power o f government to 
sanction or prohi bit must be applied to prevent the continui ng imposition o f sanctions fo r conduct 
engaged in before the date of that dec ision"). Thi s proposition seems undeniabl e; it is hard to 
imagine, as Brenn an goes on to note , th at Virg ini a mi ght keep in jail inte rrac ial couples who had 
coh ab ited w ithin the state before Loving v. Virginia, 38 8 U.S. I (1967). See United States Coin, 401 
U. S . at 728. United States Coin in fact went further: it allowed privative sanc tions (forfe itures) to be 
undone although the law authorizi ng them had bee n upheld by the Suprem e Co urt sixteen years 
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based on a change in constitutional law. Incarceration, like injunction, 
operates in futuro ; the soundness of continued imprisonment should be 
analyzed under the law at the time of the challenge.238 Imprisonment for 
conduct that is constitutionally protected is a constitutional violation re-
gardless of how sound the trial or how new the right. 
Teague's second exception, for challenges to procedures that both 
violate fundamental fairness and relate to the accuracy of the trial, is not 
quite so clearly a consequence of the decision-time model. Whether it is 
or not depends on our understanding of due process. In an influential arti-
cle, Paul Mishkin suggested that due process requirements going to the 
accuracy of a verdict represent a constitutional guarantee that no one shall 
be imprisoned except upon a showing of guilt with a certain required de-
gree of probability. 239 This is functionally true, and makes good sense as 
theory. And it follows, on this view, that habeas petitioners get the benefit 
of new rules of constitutional law relating to the accuracy of the trial. 
Their convictions may have been sound, but the constitutional guarantee 
does not only bar new convictions. It requires the States to justify impris-
onment by a particular showing, and if that showing has not been made, 
imprisonment cannot continue. Once again, the ongoing nature of the 
sanction and the availability of prospective relief make all the difference. 
The preservation of thi s exception may be of only minor consequence, 
since the Court has yet to announce a new such "component[] of basic due 
process"240 and has indicated substantial doubt that any exist 
undiscovered. 241 Regardless, judging collateral attacks in general, and 
habeas petitions in particular, by the law prevailing at the time of the 
earlier aga inst the Fifth Amendment challenge that prevailed in United States Coin See id. at 722 ; 
see also Lewis v. United States , 348 U.S . 419 (1955 ). Thi s stronger position is unsound, and it won 
the support of only four Ju sti ces. 
238 . See American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 201 (1921) 
(stating th at .. because reli ef by injunction operates in f uturo , . .. the right to it must be determined as 
of the time of the hearing"); FED. R. Cl v. P. 60(b)(5) (providing for reevaluation of injunctions in 
li ght of changed ci rcumstances). Evaluating imprisonment under the law obtaining at the time of the 
challenge does not, of course. mean that repeal of criminal laws should allow collateral attack on 
convictions on th at basis. See Welch v. Hudspeth , 132 F.2d 434, 436 (l Oth Cir. 1942) (denying 
col lateral relief to petitioner whose convic tion became fin al before repeal of Prohibition) . The 
government's poH er to puni sh conduct is not called into questi on by repeal of a law. It is only where 
punishment is constitutionall y forbidden that prospect ive reli ef should be granted on co llateral review. 
The question of chall engin g a repealed statute on the gro unds that the once-proscribed conduct 
is constitutionally protected presents a slightly more diffi cult issue, also created by statutes held 
un constituti onal on grounds (e.g .. vagueness or overbreadth) that do not suggest that a petitioner 's 
conduct is constituti onall y protected . Presumably, justice requ ires that a petitioner be all owed to ra ise 
the argum ent. desp ite the fact that the statute is no longer in force. 
239. See Mishkin , supra note 76, at 81-82 . 
240. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 313 ( 1989). 
24 1. See id 
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original trial seems by far the sounder course. Justice demands no more, 
and logic no less. Wholesale adoption of the decision-time model could 
have spared the Court the difficulties it confronted. 
In fact, the decision-time model entirely eliminates the theoretical 
structure that drove the Warren Court to its unsatisfying inconsistencies. 
It solves the problem of retroactivity. The silence of the question of retro-
activity before Linkletter is thus precisely the same as that in Arthur Co-
nan Doyle's Silver Blaze . The dog did not bark because it recognized its 
master. 
When Linkletter introduced the transaction-time model, it did not offer 
the best possible response to a difficult new problem. It created the prob-
lem and offered a plainly inadequate response. I have tried to suggest why 
it did so; the next question is why the decision-time model did not make 
its way back. Answering this question does not require quite the same 
degree of speculation; the model's attempt to do so, and its ultimate fail-
ure, are there in the caselaw. The exile of the decision-time model and its 
unsuccessful return is the hidden story of retroactivity jurisprudence. The 
next section tells it for the first time. 
3. Why Not the Decision-Time Model? The Secret History 
of Retroactivity 
Viewing the caselaw with an awareness of the two models produces a 
picture startlingly different from the received wisdom . The struggle over 
retroactivity-the vacillation between decision-time and transaction-time 
result-has been a mask for the deeper conflict between the two models. 
It has been, in many ways, a proxy war, and while decision-time result has 
won most of the battles, the decision-time model has lost the heans and 
minds of the federal bench. At the level of result, the current embrace of 
retroactivity has returned us to where we started. But in terms of the mod-
els, things are quite different. By rereading the caselaw from this per-
spective, we may know the place for the first time. 
To understand the cases in terms of the dueling models, it is important 
to be able to ascertain which one a court is employing. Because the dis-
tinction between the two has never been explicitly addressed, this is not 
always easy. A decision that announces that new Jaw will be applied only 
prospectively is clearly working within the transaction-time model. 
Harder issues are presented by cases that apply new Jaw retroactively . The 
decision-time model, by applying new law, produces automatic retroactive 
effect. It does not, however, rely on the concept of retroactivity to do so, 
and this fact allows the distinction to be made. 
If the decision-time model is adopted, the concept of "retroactivity" 
• 
I 
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drops out of the analysis. Decision-time law is applied without retroac-
tively changing transaction-time law, for the simple reason that only deci-
sion-time law is relevant. Given this fact, the framing ofthe issue in terms 
of retroactivity is itself an indicator of the transaction-time model. 
It might seem surprising that this is really a reliable indicator. Surely, 
one might think, once the Court began to talk about retroactivity, cases 
presenting the issue used the terminology, and diction ceased to be reve-
latory. I would agree with this objection if the concept of retroactivity did 
pervade the case law, if after Linkletter the Supreme Court never achieved 
retroactive effect without a mention of retroactivity. But the reality is oth-
erwise. Several Justices have urged analyses that do not mention retroac-
tivity/42 and several cases have applied new law without discussing the 
concept. 243 The decision-time model is there in the caselaw, and its propo-
nents have been remarkably consistent in employing its distinctive vo-
cabulary. Cases that analyze the issue in terms of "retroactivity" are thus 
best understood as employing a transaction-time model. 
The decision-time model also has its indicators. As discussed above, a 
decision that grants retroactive effect to new law without discussing retro-
activity must work within the decision-time model. More obviously, deci-
sions that assert that courts must decide cases based on their best current 
understanding of the law employ decision-time analysis. A final mark of 
this approach is the assertion that earlier inconsistent decisions were cor-
rect. As noted earlier, the transaction-time model reaches decision-time 
results by retroactively altering transaction-time law. This creates error in 
earlier decisions; thus, an opinion that characterizes earlier decisions as 
correct must employ the decision-time model. 
This last indicator is not entirely reliable, given the two different 
senses of "correct when decided."244 It does, however, tend to match up 
well in the caselaw with the indicia considered previously.245 Using these 
criteria, it is possible to identify the model driving the analysis in virtually 
every case. What emerges is a persistent struggle subject to the vagaries 
of Court membership and the exigencies of doctrinal change. 
The story begins with the demise of the Blackston ian conception of 
law, which freed the two models to compete. Because the practice under 
242. See, e.g. Williams v United States, 401 US 667,679 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting); James 
B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 US. 529, 548-49 ( 1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
243. See, e.g, Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 US 350 (1991); 
Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U.S 538 (1941). 
244. See supra note 193. 
245. For examples of decision-time model cases characterizing earlier decisions as correct, see 
Vanden bark, 311 U.S. at 543, and United States v. The Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. ( 1 Cranch) l 03, 110 
(1801) 
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the Blackstonian understanding was to give automatic etTect to later 
statements of the law, the decision-time model had a significant advan-
tage. Already enshrined in Marshall ' s The Schooner Peggy opinion, it 
quickly extended its reach to law-changing decisions. Within the deci-
sion-time model, the concept of retroactivity plays no role, and Supreme 
Court decisions through the 1940s, relying heavily on The Schooner 
Peggy, applied decision-time law without discussion in cases where 
changes were wrought by intervening legislation246 or decisions .247 Van-
denbark v. Ch'ens-Jllinois Glass Co. 24 8 explicitly repudiated Burgess and 
Kuhn, holding that federal courts "should conform their orders to the state 
law as of the time of the entry. Intervening and conflicting decisions will 
thus cause the reversal of judgments which were correct when entered."249 
The conflict began in earnest with Linkletter. That decision planted 
itself squarely, if ineptly, within the transaction-time model. 250 But it soon 
became apparent that Linkletter's grounds were too hot to stand on; with 
Stovall the Court began a frenetic dance, protecting one part of its sensi-
tive jurisprudence only to expose another to the fire of criticism.251 From 
the beginning, the transaction-time model was beset with difficulty, as the 
Court tried to draw lines that its own theory erased. Justice White ' s 
Engle-Hankerson approach to habeas petitions offered the possibility of 
achieving different results for collateral and direct review within the trans-
action-time framework. Had the Court followed thi s line of reasoning 
(and abandoned selective prospectivity in favor of uniformly retroactive 
result on direct appeal), it would have done the best it could with the tool s 
at hand, and a stable body of doctrine might have resulted. The opinions 
246. See, e.g, Carpenter v. Wabash Ry. Co., 309 U.S. 23 (1 940) . Carpenrer. like The Schooner 
Peggy, is best understood as standing for decision-time iaw rather than dec ision-time result. The 
statute at issue explicitly provided for application to cases "now . pending in an y court of the 
United States ." ld at 27 (quoting Bankruptcy Act, 53 Stat. 1406 (1 939) (codified at II USC. ~ 
205(n)) (repealed 1978)). 
247. See, e.g., Vandenbark, 311 U.S. at 538. 
248 . See id 
249. /d at 543. 
250. That the decision-time model was the exi sting baseline that Linkle rrer disturbed can be see n 
from the fact where the issue was retroactive legislation, which Linklerrer did not discuss, the 
decision-time model persisted in a line of cases relying on The Schooner Peggy, and running through 
Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham, 393 U.S. 268,231 (1 969), up to Bradley v. School Board of 
Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974). Bradley is illustrative: "We anchor our holdin g in this case on 
the principle that a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision . ." !d Thi s 
line effectively came to an end when the Supreme Court reevaluated leg islati ve retroactivity in 
Landgraf v. US! Film Prods , 511 US. 244 (1994). 
251. Colorful metaphors for the Court 's wild retroactivity jurisprudence an: not un co mmon. See. 
e g, Williams v. United States, 401 U S. 667, 676 ( 1971) (Harl an, J , di sse nting) (lamenting that the 
course of the Linkleller doctrine has become "almos t as diffi cul t to foll ow as the tracks made by a 
beast of prey in search of its intended victim"). 
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of Justice Harlan, however, offered both the possibility of another way and 
attacks on the transaction-time model that eventually proved irresistible. 
That his criticisms did not produce an ascendancy of the decision-time 
model results from two failures to distinguish between model and result-
one on the part of the Griffith Court, and one on the part of Justice Harlan 
himself. 
Justice Harlan's recommendations for the treatment of cases on direct 
review clearly urge the adoption of a decision-time model. 252 His discus-
sions of such cases never call for "retroactive application" of decisions but 
simply for application of "the prevailing decisional rule."253 Transaction-
time results, in Justice Harlan's view, may be produced by the law of 
remedies/54 but this question is distinct from the issue of what law to ap-
ply. The demand that courts "apply the Jaw as it is at the time, not as it 
once was,"25 5 speaks to the analytical model but does not require any par-
ticular result. 
When majority support for this analysis on direct review emerged, 
however, it operated at the level of result. Although Griffith v. Kentucky 
claims to adopt Justice Harlan's position, its recurrent invocation of "ret-
roactive application"256 marks it quite clearly as a product of the transac-
tion-time model. Moreover, as subsequent cases made clear/57 Griffith 
rejected only selective prospectivity; it did not speak to the possibility of 
refusing to apply a new rule in the case in which it was announced. The 
vindication of Justice Harlan's views announced in Griffith was only par-
tial. 
Griffith did not itself mark the resurgence of the decision-time model 
for cases on direct review, but given the persistent conflation of model and 
result, Griffith's decision-time result pushed towards the decision-time 
model. Adoption of the Harlan analysis for habeas petitions, on the other 
hand, offered no support to the decision-time model because Justice 
Harlan himself had remained within the transaction-time model. Appar-
ently believing that applying decision-time law to habeas petitions would 
result in "readjudicating convictions according to all legal standards in 
252. See. e.g , Williams, 401 U.S . at 681 ("! continue to believe that a proper perception of our 
duties as a court of law .. . mandates that we appl y the law as it is at the time, not as it o nce was."); 
United States v. Estate of Donnell y, 397 U.S . 286, 296 (1970) (Harlan , J., concurring) ("[O]nce the 
decision to abandon prece dent is made, I see no justification for applying principl es determined to be 
wrong, be they constituti onal or otherwi se, to litigants who are in or may still come to court."). 
253. Estate of Donnelly, 397 US. at 297. 
254. See id. at 296-97 . 
255. Williams, 401 U.S. at 681. 
256 . See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 , 316, 318, 322 , 328 (1987) 
257 . See, e.g, James B. Beam Dis tilling Co. v. Georgia, 50 1 U.S 529,538 (199 1). 
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effect when a habeas petition is filed," 258 Justice Harlan instead urged the 
application of transaction-time law.259 Noting the desirability of "leaving 
concluded litigation in a state of repose," he concluded that concerns for 
finality could defeat the judicial presumption in favor of applying the best 
current understanding of the law. 260 When Teague v. Lane approved Jus-
tice Harlan's reasoning, it understandably did so within a transaction-time 
model. 
Far more puzzling than the transaction-time framework of the Teague 
Court is Justice Harlan's abandonment of the decision-time model for ha-
beas cases, an unsound and unnecessary step by a great jurist. The posi-
tion is unsound because finality is unacceptable as a normative justifica-
tion. The interest in finality is always present, and ordinarily does not 
overcome a constitutional violation in the conduct of a trial. Because the 
transaction-time model erases the difference between old and new law, the 
principle of finality cannot distinguish between habeas petitions relying on 
new law and ones urging violations of old law. Nor does it satisfactorily 
distinguish between habeas petitions and cases on direct review, since the 
States' interests in avoiding disruption and the defendants' interests in 
application of the new rule are quite similar in both types of cases. 261 
Justice Harlan's invocation of finality is also unnecessary within the 
decision-time model. On the transaction-time model, a retroactive deci-
sion works to change transaction-time law, and thus obviously changes the 
law applicable to the habeas petitioner as well. The same is not true from 
the decision-time perspective. The consequence of the decision-time 
model, as noted above, is that earlier decisions (pegged to their respective 
dates) are correct. By preserving the correctness of earlier decisions, the 
decision-time model distinguishes between direct and collateral review in 
a way that the transaction-time does not. 
While neither Griffith nor Teague marked the return of the decision-
time model, their invocations of Harlan and their embrace of decision-time 
results on direct review showed that the time was ripe for a countercoup. 
The presence on the Court of conservative Justices, notably Antonin 
Scalia, who subscribed to the "right answer" model of judicial lawmaking, 
provided the needed impetus. In American Trucking Ass 'ns v. Smith, 262 the 
two models met head-on. Justice O'Connor, writing for a plurality of four, 
gave a clear statement of the transaction-time approach. 263 Invoking Chev-
258. Williams, 401 U.S. at 683. 
259. See id 
260. See id 
261. See supra note 188. 
262. 496 U.S 167 (1990). 
263. See id at 171-200. 
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ron Oil, in what was to be its last appearance in an opinion of the Court, 
she urged the limitation of Griffith to the criminal context and concluded 
that the Scheiner decision should not be applied retroactively.264 
The dissent, by contrast, offered an analysis rooted in the decision-
time model. Also writing for four Justices, Justice Stevens argued that 
"adherence to legal principle requires that we determine the rights of liti-
gants in accordance with our best current understanding of the law." 265 
Quoting Justice Harlan's concurrence in Estate of Donnelly, he concluded 
that "'while there is flexibility in the law of remedies, this does not affect 
the underlying substantive principle that short of a bar of res judicata or 
statute of limitations, courts should apply the prevailing decisional rule to 
the cases before them. "'266 
Justice Scalia provided the necessary fifth vote for transaction-time 
result. But, much like the Gelpcke Court, he did so from a Blackstonian 
perspective, admitting the authority of the earlier decision but denying its 
correctness. Thus while five members of the Court were willing to reach 
the transaction-time resu lt , five were also clearly lined up behind the deci-
sion-time model. Subsequent cases showed, however, that the Justices did 
not view the issue with the clarity in which Smith had presented it. 
Two cases handed down on the same day in 1991, James B. Beam 
Distilling Co. v. Georgia267 and Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow 
v. Gilbertson ,268 highlighted the tension within the Court. The five-
member Lampf majority applied decision-time law with no mention of 
retroactivity-an opinion c learly within the dec is ion-time model. 269 In 
James Bearn, by contrast, the Court reached a dec ision-time result via ret-
roactive application of the new rule. 270 The two-Justice plurality, along 
with one concurring Justice and the three dissenters, employed the trans-
action-time model. 271 Only the three-Justice concurrence, composed of 
264. See id at 178-79. 
265. fd at 2i4 (Stevens, J , dissenting). 
266. fd at 2 15 (q uoti ng United States v Es tate of Donnelly, 397 U.S 286, 297 ( 1970) (Harlan, J., 
concurring)). 
267. 501 us 529 (1991) . 
268 . 50 1 U.S. 350 (1991) 
269. See id. at 35 i . 
270. See Beam, 50 I U S at 544. 
27 1. See id at 532. Justi ce O'Connor, in dissent, attempted the Gelpcke/Smith maneuver of 
refusi ng retroactive effect to decisions believed wrong and argued th at although Bacchus Imports Ltd 
v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984), had app li ed its rule to the parti es before the Court, stare decisis did not 
co mpel her to retroactive application of the mlc in Beam. See id. at 550-52 (O'Connor, J., 
dissenting). With in the decision-time n:odel. this move is legitimate. Because the decision-time 
result in Scheiner changes the law only after th at deci sion, the tax at iss ue in Smith was constitutional 
until Scheiner was handed down. Justice O'Connor. however, is a consis tent proponent of the 
transaction-time model. On th is mode of anal ys is. the eark:r decision-t ime result in Bacchus asserts 
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Justices Scalia, Marshall, and Blackmun, advocated the decision-time 
model. 
With the resignation of Justice Brennan, Justice Scalia lost a staunch, 
if unlikely, decision-time ally. The latest changes in the Court have re-
moved two more, Justices Marshall and Blackmun,272 and while the new 
additions have supported decision-time results, the decision-time model 
seems again on the wane. The most recent cases, Harper v. Virginia De-
partment of Taxation 273 and Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 274 have 
reached decision-time results but have done so, like James Beam, within a 
transaction-time model. Both cases framed the question as one of "retro-
active effect," and both held that application of a new rule in the case an-
nouncing it implies that the rule is retroactive. 275 Only Justice Scalia, con-
curring in Harper, argued for the decision-time model. 276 
Like the Warren Court, the current Court tends towards the transac-
tion-time model. Unlike its predecessor, however, it does so with an 
awareness of the model's limitations, disavowing the incoherence of se-
lective prospectivity. Pure prospectivity, though still mentioned as per-
missible, seems unlikely to reemerge. Not only does a strong majority 
seem to favor decision-time results, but even the prospectivity proponents 
are reluctant not to apply a new rule in the case announcing it, because of 
the advisory opinion problem. 277 Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, the 
champions of prospectivity, thus find themselves in an unenviable double 
bind. Avoiding advisory opinions requires them to urge retroactive appli-
cation in the first case, but once this has been granted, the consistent ma-
jority opposition to selective prospectivity requires retroactive application 
thereafter. In terms of reaching transaction-time results via prospectivity, 
their tools are not equal to their task. 
A glance at the academic reviews of the Court's performance reveals 
that it is not a hit. 278 The lukewarm reception is justified; the caselaw is an 
uninspiring hodgepodge of two- and three-Justice opinions. It could be 
much better, and employing the decision-time model would make it so, as 
not only what the law is, but what it was at the time of the transaction. Its stare decisis effect, then, 
extends retroactively all the way back to the transaction. 
272. Both Justice Brennan and Justice Blackmun were late converts to the decision-time model. 
Until United States v. Johnson, 457 US. 53 7 (1982), both Justices had taken positions inconsistent 
with Justice Harlan's approach on direct review. See, eg, Williams v United States, 401 U.S 646 
(1971); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S 244 (1969). 
273. 509 U.S. 86 ( 1993) 
274. 514 U.S 749 (1995). 
275. See Harper, 509 U.S at 90; Reynoldsville Casket, 514 U.S. at 753. 
276 . See Harper, 509 U.S. at 102-10 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
277. See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co, 482 US. 656. 689-90 ( 1987) (O'Connor, J, concurring). 
278. See sources cited supra notes 166-67. 
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the following section demonstrates . 
4. Using the Decision-Time Model 
a. Criminal Procedure 
Within the decision-time model , the concept of retroactivity has no 
role to play. The result of adopting this model in the criminal procedure 
context would thus be the application of new rules to all cases on direct 
review, consistent with the traditional judicial duty to resolve cases ac-
cording to the best current understanding of the law. 279 Cases on collateral 
review, by contrast, would be analyzed according to the law prevailing at 
the time of the original trial. The decision-time model thus produces re-
sults very similar to those of the current Griffith/Teague regime, with sub-
stantially greater doctrinal coherence. 
Prospective results would be reached through the law of remedies . 
The remedial flexibility of reviewing courts in the area of criminal proce-
dure is not entirely cl ear, and a pre-Warren Court might have been justi-
fiably hesitant to rely on the law of remedies to mitigate the disruptive 
effect of new constitutional rules. Until the 1960s, it was generally as-
sumed "that constitutional violations could never be regarded as harmless 
error.''280 The ability to reach transaction-time resu lts on direct review of 
cr iminal appeals was thus severely constrained in precisely the area of the 
Court 's great crimina l procedure innovations. However, in part perhaps 
because of those innovations, the Warren Court also reworked the harm-
less error doctrine. In 1963, four Justices in Fahy v. ConnecticuP81 had 
indicated a di sposition to hold that erroneous admission of unconstitution-
a lly obtained ev idence could be deemed harmless on appeal. Four years 
later, Chapman v. California282 explicitly recognized the possi bility of 
harmless constitutional error. 
Both Fah_v and Chapman are, from one perspective, retroactivity 
cases, in that the "errors" in both were produced by decisions intervening 
between tri a l and appellate rev iew.283 Neither, however, features an ex-
plicit di scuss ion of retroactivity; the effect of the rule is determined en-
tirely by remedial doctrines. Harmless error analysis, of course, is not 
ent ire ly sat isfactory in that it makes no inquiry into the purpose of the rul e. 
279. See generally Note. supra note 225 (urging the applicati on of dec ision-time law and the usc of 
remedial tl ex ibility in the limited context of exclus ionary rule decis ions on direct review). 
280. Y ALE KAMISAR ET AL, M ODERN CRIMINAL PROC EDURE 1605 (8 th ed. 1994). 
28 I. 3 75 U.S. 85 ( 1963) . 
282. 386 U.S. 18 ( 1967). 
283 Interven in g in Chapman was Grijjin v. Californ ia, 380 U.S. 609, 613-15 (1965), wh ich held 
unconstitutional pwsccutorial co mment on a defendant's failure to tes tify. Mapp v. Ohio. 367 U.S . 
643 ( 1961 ), the case at issue in Linkleller, intervened between trial and appellate revi ew in Fahy 
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It is thus at best a somewhat unprincipled stop-gap measure. 
A purpose-based analysis would have a reach both broader and more 
discerning. Where the purpose of a new rule is deterrent, as the Court's 
Fourth Amendment innovations have been, an individual defendant has 
little grounds on which to complain if the exclusionary remedy is withheld 
in his case. Given that the exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy 
rather than a substantive individual right, reviewing courts should have 
some latitude in withholding it where new rules are at issue. Rules creat-
ing procedural rights that do belong to defendants, rather than to society, 
would by contrast demand remedies on direct review. 284 
The danger posed by a purpose-based analysis is that a predictable 
remedial regime under which, for example, the exclusionary remedy was 
withheld for new Fourth Amendment rules, would give litigants little in-
centive to raise novel claims. The result might be a dramatic decrease in 
the pace of constitutional change. Selective prospectivity-rewarding 
only the litigant in whose case a new rule is announced-has been sug-
gested as the best way to preserve litigant incentives while minimizing the 
disruption of state criminal justice systems.285 
Selective prospectivity, however, is impossible to reconcile with 
courts' commitment to do justice to litigants on the merits of their individ-
ual cases. Nor, [think, is it really necessary to prevent constitutional ossi-
fication. A purpose-based inquiry, recall , would withhold a remedy only 
where the new rule is a clear break with existing doctrine. If the new rule 
has any basis in constitutional law, it can presumably also be reached in-
crementally. Finally, the concern about litigants' incentives is minimized 
by any remedial calculus that is not perfectly predictable. Since no clear 
line exists between incremental changes in law and rules so new that their 
enforcement would serve no deterrent purpose, the result of a purpose-
based inquiry should seldom be foreordained. Moreover, the extent to 
which the Fourth Amendment deters questionable police conduct is a 
function of how willing courts are to apply new rules. The degree of de-
terrence desired is a fact-sensitive question that could well be influenced 
by the circumstances of an individual case. If uncertainty as to whether a 
remedy will be granted exists, and if arguments can be made on either 
side, I itigants can be expected to press novel claim s as vigorously as ever. 
A purpose-based remedial inquiry, used within the deci s ion-time 
model, would allow courts to do justice to litigants on the merits of their 
claims . It would permit prospective application of some new rules with out 
234. An example of this sort of ri ght is the right to counsel recognized by Gideon v. Wainwright, 
372 U.S. 335 (1 963) 
285. Se!' , e.g., Fall on & Meltzer. supra note 42, at 1811-12. 
• 
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selectively warping the substantive law around lucky individuals, and it 
would preserve litigants' incentives to pursue novel claims . While the 
post-Griffith Court seems to have little interest in reaching prospective 
results in criminal cases on direct review, the possibility exists. 
b. Statutes of Limitations 
Decisions applying new statutes of limitations offer one of the clearer 
cases for purpose-based analysis . Lampj, for example , featured a situation 
in which lower courts had regularly borrowed state statutes of limitations 
to govern the federal right of action implied under Rule 1 Ob-5. The Court 
decided that a uniform federal statute of limitations would better serve 
justice by promoting uniformity and predictability.286 This reasoning is 
quite convincing; what is harder to see is how the purposes of uniformity 
and predictability are served by applying the new federal statute of limita-
tions to cases pending on direct review. The Larnpj Court notably passed 
over this issue without discussion , provoking both a sharp dissent and an 
unsuccessful attempt by Congress to undo the inequitable results. 
The decision-time model, which the Lampj Court adopted, in no way 
compels this decision-time result. The doctrine of equitable tolling is 
regularly applied to protect parties whose claims have lapsed through no 
fault of their own, 287 and could easily have been applied in Lampj 288 But 
Lampfs rejection of equitable tolling was echoed by Reynoldsville Casket. 
That case featured an Ohio state tolling statute that " in effect, gave Ohio 
tort plaintiffs unlimited time to sue out-of-state (but not in-state) defen-
dants. "289 The Court held the statute unconstitutional in Bendix Autolite 
Corp. v. lvfidwesco Enterprises, Inc. / 90 and the question in Reynoldsville 
Casket was the retroactive effect of Bendix. Because the Bendix Court had 
applied its rule to the parties before it, Harper demanded that it be applied 
also to the Reynoldsville Casket plaintiff. 
286. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind . Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson , 50 I U.S 350. 35 7 ( 1991) 
287. Usually. equitable tolling is invoked where the injury has not bc<:n di scove red. It is but a 
small stretch to apply this to situations in which the injured party has relied on authoritative judicial 
statements of a statute of limitations. 
288. The Lampf plaintiffs raised the eq uitable tolling argument, and the Court rejected it , based on 
what it termed ' 'the inescapable co nclusion that Congress did not intend equi tabl e to iling to apply in 
actions under the securities laws." Lampf, 50 I U.S. at 363. This may well be correct as a matter of 
congressional intent with res pect to securities actions generall y. The result of its applicati on in 
Lamp}; h owev~r . was so disturbing to Congress that it enacted on ly partl y constitutional legi slation in 
an only partly success ful attempt to reverse the dec isi on. See Pl au t v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 US. 
2 11 , 225 (1995} (concluding that the leg islation violated the separation of powe rs because it 
instructed federal courts to reopen fin al judgments) . Given the co ngre ss ional response, equitab le 
tolling see ms fairly co nso nant with what Congress would have intended on the facts of Lampj 
289. Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S . 749,750 (1995) 
290. 486 U.S 888, 894-95 (1988). 
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The plaintiff tried to avoid this result by arguing that the Ohio courts 
might continue to toll the statute of limitations "as a state law 'equitable' 
device. " 291 The Court rejected the invitation, stating that "we do not see 
how ... the Ohio Supreme Court could change a legal outcome that fed -
eral law, applicable under the Supremacy Clause, would otherwise dictate 
simply by calling its refusal to apply that federal law an effort to create a 
remedy." 292 The significance of Reynoldsville Casket is not entirely clear. 
Given that it relied on the application of Bendix to the Bendix parties, it is 
still possible to maintain that a court may consider equitable factors in 
granting remedies in the first case applying a new rule and be cons istent 
thereafter. Thus Reynoldsville Casket may merely extend to remedies the 
Beam Court's statement that "the substantive law will not shift and 
spring":93 on the basis of individual equities .294 
On this reading, the Court demanded no more than cons istency with 
Bendix, 295 and Bendix is intelligible on a purpose-based remedial analys is . 
The Ohio tolling provision at issue in Bendix and Reynoldsville Casket 
was struck down not in order to promote uniformi ty and predictability, but 
rather to prevent discrimination against out-of-state defendants. The pur-
pose of preventing discrimination was quite clearly served by reaching a 
dec ision-time result, and it might even have req uired the Court to reject an 
attempt by the Ohio court to invoke equ itable tolling.296 Use of equitable 
tolling to reach prospective results in cases applying new statutes of limi-
tations is consistent with the decision-time model , the Court' s precedents, 
and considerations of substantive justice . 
c. Tax Refunds 
Cases seeking refunds of unconstitutionally collected taxes provide 
perhaps the most tempting case for the transaction-time model. Where the 
conduct complained of is ongoing, as is the case with tax collection, the 
transaction-time model allows for purely prospective relief without facing 
the advisory opinion problem. This approach, however, would come into 
291 Reynoldsv ille Casket , 514 U S. at 753 . 
292. lei 
293. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 50 1 U.S. 529,543 (1991) 
294. What makes this reading of Reynoldsville Casket a littl e difficult is the statement th at federal 
law, i.e., the unconstitution ality of the tolling statute. di ctates the r~s ult. It is not clear why the 
remed ial inquiry is no t a state law questi on: why the Ohi o courts could not equi tably toll the 
otherwise appli cable Ohio statute of limitations as a matter of state remedi al law. The Reynoldsville 
Casket opinion suggests that remedial di screti on cannot be used to reach transaction-time resu lts. and 
thus seems to abandon Beam ' s di stinction between the " remedi al" an d the "cho ice-o f-l aw" in quiri es. 
295. The retroactivity issue in Bendix was raised for the first time on appeal, and the Court refused 
to co nsider it. Apparentl y as a consequen ce. it applied the decis ion retroacti ve ly. 
296 . Thi s issue was not clearly presented, as the Ohio cou rt character ized its dispos iti on as refu sing 
retroactive effect. See Hyde v. Reynoldsville Casket Co .. 626 N.E.2d 75.77 (Ohio 1994) . 
-
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immediate conflict with Griffith. 297 If a state pursued both a civil and a 
criminal action against resisting taxpayers and both cases reached the 
Court on direct review, a civil holding of non-retroactivity, coupled with 
Gr!ffith's required criminal retroactivity, would produce conflicting state-
ments about the constitutionality of the tax. 
This conflict could be avoided if Griffith's decision-time results were 
reached within a decision-time model, 298 and consistency could be pro-
duced by a regime that called for the transaction-time model in civil cases 
but the decision-time model in criminal ones. This dichotomy, at the level 
of result, was urged by Justice O'Connor in Smith/99 and rejected over her 
dissent in Harper. 300 The distinction is no easier to justify in terms of con-
ceptual models. Although distinguishing between criminal and civil cases 
would allow the Court somewhat greater freedom in civil cases featuring 
ongoing conduct, it is too unprincipled to be very attractive. 
Although it is ultimately undesirable, the transaction-time model is 
made more appealing by the difficulty in reaching prospective results via 
remedial analysis in tax refund cases . The costs to states of refunding un-
constitutional taxes can be immense, and courts may understandably want 
to avoid imposing crushing refund liability. 301 Of course, a mere finding of 
unconstitutionality does not mandate refunds. In some circumstances, 
taxes may be retroactively altered by the state to render them constitu-
tional ; this is often the case with taxes that violate the Equal Protection 
Clause or the dormant Commerce Clause.302 Additionally, the availability 
of a predeprivation hearing may allow states to avoid refunds. 303 The 
question is whether prospective results may be reached where no predepri-
vation hearing was available and no retroactive reformation is possible. 
The purpose-oriented analysis suggests not; since the reasons behind the 
unconstitutionality of a tax will ordinarily be applicable to the individual 
taxpayers, it seems that no remedial adjustment should be made. 
In support of this position, it might be argued that states that uncon-
stitutionally collect taxes without affording taxpayers an opportunity to 
297 . Thi s point and a more extended exposition of the foll owing example have been nice ly made 
by Fallon and Meltzer. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 42, at 1767-68. 
293. On the dec ision-rime model, the constitutionality of the tax in the past would not affect the 
result on direct review. Nor would it on collateral review, since a decision-time court would grant a 
habeas petiti on to a person impri soned for constitutionall y protected conduct. If the prospect ive 
decision was not constitutionally grounded, a habeas petitioner wou ld get no relie( but thi s result is 
not in consis tent with prospective invalidation. 
299 . See American Trucking Ass' ns v. Smith , 496 U.S. 167, 197-99 (1990). 
300. See Harper v. Virginia Dep ' t ofTaxation, 509 U.S 86,97 ( 1993). 
30 I. See id at 129-30 (O'Connor, J ., dissenting). 
302. See id at I 00-0 I. 
303 . See id 
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challenge their legitimacy deserve no special solicitude. This argument 
may be too strong, since an unpredictable Supreme Court decision has the 
potential to inflict massive liability on a state acting in good faith. The 
problem, however, is a result of the anomalous treatment of tax refund 
suits, rather than a retroactivity issue. 
The doctrine of sovereign immunity generally frees states from the 
obligation to pay compensatory damages for past injuries. The normative 
rationale for the different treatment of tax refunds is hard to uncover, es-
pecially since it seems to favor prope11y over life and liberty in the con-
stitutional calculus. 304 Regardless of the explanation, the solution to the 
problem of state liability for unconstitutionally collected taxes should be 
sought in immunity doctrines rather than by a deformation of retroactivity 
jurisprudence.305 It might be reasonable, for example, for the Court to cre-
ate a qualified immunity to tax refund suits similar to that enjoyed by state 
officials against Section 1983 damages actions for constitutional viola-
tions.306 
IV. CONCLUS ION 
The formulation of a theoretically justifiable approach to retroactivity 
must start with a reformation of the underlying conceptual framework. 
The Warren Court ' s adoption of the transaction-time model marked an 
unfortunate turn into doctrinal confusion and incoherence; the current 
Court has undertaken repairs at the level of result and has consequently 
304. The positive rationale is on ly somewhat clearer. Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17. 24 
(1920), rests its refund requirement on the principle that "money got through imposi tion may be 
recovered back," and derives thi s principl e in turn from the Takings Clause. The Takings Clause 
cannot be the whole story, however, since no refund of an unconstitutional tax is required if the state 
provides an opportunity for a predeprivation hearing. See McKesson Corp. v. Divis ion of Alcoholic 
Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 36-3 7 ( 1990). Monies collected under an unconstitutional tax 
would sti ll seem to be private property taken for public use, and the Takings Clause makes no 
exception for tak in gs wi th due process . Where no predeprivation hearing is avai lable, the refund 
requirement is currently characterized as tlowing from the Due Process Clause . See id. at 31. 
305 . Interest ingl y, Scheiner offered the possibility of pure prospectivity by remand to the state 
co urt for resolution of th e retroactivity question. See American Trucking Ass'ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 
266, 297-98 (1987) . State co urts are often not prohibited from issuing advisory opinions and might 
favor state tax authorities over out-of-state plaintiffs. On remand, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 
for example, held the Scheiner decision purel y prospective. See American Trucking Ass' ns v. 
McNulty , 596 A.2d 784 , 790 (Pa. 199 1 ). Huwever. the retroactivity of a dete rmination of 
unconstitutionality is a federal questi on, as the Smith Court held . See American Trucking Ass'ns v. 
Smi th, 496 U.S. 167, 177 (1990). The ability of a state court on reman d to adjust remedi es to blunt 
the effect of a federal holding of retroactivity has been cast in seri ous doubt by Reynoldsville Casket. 
306. This would require a chang"! in Takings Clause jurisprudence, since First Eng lish £,•angelical 
Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles. 482 U.S 304, 316 n.9 ( 1987 ), rejected the argument that 
sovereign immunity can bar a mon etary remedy under the Just Compensation Cl ause. 
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been only partially successful. The decision-time model , advocated by 
Justice Harlan and displayed in the pre-Warren Courtjurisprudence, would 
allow the Court to reach its currently preferred results with greater theo-
retical consistency. 
Choice of analytical model does not determine results. While adop-
tion of the decision-time model would bring a theoretical coherence, it 
would not uniformly require decision-time results . The existing doctrines 
of remedial discretion, including harmless error and equitable tolling, 
would allow courts to reach just results in the cases before them without 
deforming retroactivity jurisprudence to suit remedial preferences. In ar-
eas where remedial discretion does not provide sufficient flexibility, as 
may be the case with tax refund suits, the answer must be sought in the 
substantive law of those particular areas. 
Most importantly, the dec ision-time model makes the distinction be-
tween direct and collateral review that has been so elusive. Abandoning 
the transaction-time model will free the Court from the impossible task of 
trying to justify results that cannot be justified within its theoretical 
framework; it will solve the problem of retroactivity. On this foundation , 
a coherent jurisprudence may be built. 
